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It is common practice in the literature to divide the landscape of con-
ditionals into two camps — the indicatives and subjunctives — and the-
orize about each camp separately. Unfortunately, it is often unclear
exactly what the distinction amounts to. Take Ernest Adams’ famous
minimal pair (Adams [1970]):
(1) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
Indicative
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
Subjunctive
Without trying to guess what others may have had in mind, let’s draw
some distinctions and make some stipulations. First, we may distin-
guish (1) and (2) both grammatically and semantically. (1) is distin-
guished grammatically from (2) by the fact that the latter carries an
extra layer of past tense (marked morphologically in English with the
past perfect “had”) and the modal auxiliary verb “would” in its conse-
quent.1 The relevant semantic difference between (1) and (2) is shown
by the fact that, since we know that Kennedy was shot and that there
was no backup shooter (since we’re Warrenites), (1) is true while (2) is
false — so, (1) and (2) have different truth conditions. Intuitively, (1) is
about how the world was, given what we now know plus the suppo-
sition of its antecedent; (2) is about how the world would have been
1. Notice, though, that the extra layer of past tense in (2) doesn’t shift the event
time of the if-clause to past. To see this clearly, notice that “tomorrow” is
felicitous in the if-clause of the following subjunctive, which is not the case
when the same sentence occurs outside of the if-clause:
(i) The contest was held today . . .
a. If Smith had entered tomorrow, he would have missed it.
b. Lucky for Sue, she had (already) entered the contest last night.
c. #Unfortunately for Smith, he had (already) entered the contest to-
morrow.
This feature of subjunctive conditionals has been called “forward time shift” in
the conditionals literature (cf. Gibbard [1981], Dudman [1983], Dudman [1984],
Edgington [1995], Bennett [2003]).
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(not what we know about it) were its antecedent to have held. In slo-
gan form: the indicative conditional (1) is epistemic, while the sub-
junctive conditional (2) is metaphysical.2 Let’s stipulate that the indica-
tive/subjunctive distinction is the grammatical one, and let “epistemic”
and “metaphysical” label the different meanings of the two condition-
als.
These observations immediately raise the question of why the gram-
matical difference between (1) and (2) gives rise to the corresponding
semantic difference between them.3 This question is pressing in light
of the work of Sabine Iatridou, who argues that this grammatical dif-
ference (a combination of past + future morphology) yields a similar
semantic difference across a range of unrelated languages.4 We thus
put the question as follows:
2. However we characterize it, this semantic distinction between epistemic
and metaphysical modality is both intuitive and philosophically important. It’s
why, for instance, subjunctives, but not indicatives, figure into talk about causal-
ity (see Lewis [1986, 2000], Woodward [2003]) and bear an intimate connec-
tion to laws of nature (see Goodman [1947], Chisholm [1955], Maudlin [2007],
Lange [2009]) and chance (Lewis [1979], Lewis [1980], Albert [2000]), and what
drives causal decision theorists to insist that it’s the probability of subjunctives
(rather than indicatives) that ought to guide rational deliberation (see Gibbard
& Harper [1981], Lewis [1981a, 1981b], Williamson [2007]).
3. This question cross-cuts another issue surrounding indicatives and subjunc-
tives, namely, whether the two kinds of conditionals are semantically unified.
Unifiers include Stalnaker (1975), Edgington (1995), Lycan (2001), while non-
unifiers include Lewis (1973), Gibbard (1981), Bennett (2003). The question may
seem to be of more interest to a unifier as answering it will presumably be part
of her answer as to how indicatives and subjunctives can mean different things
despite sharing some common semantic core. However, it is also a pressing
question for non-unifiers, for even if indicatives and subjunctives involve dis-
tinct conditional operators, it’s an open question how grammar mediates the
selection of operator.
4. See Iatridou (2000), pp. 245, 263–266, von Fintel & Iatridou (2008), pp. 120–
126, and also Steele (1975), James (1982). In addition to Romance and Germanic
languages, Iatridou cites evidence from Modern Greek, Papago, Proto-Uto-
Aztecan, Japanese, Korean, Hebrew, Turkish, and Basque.
the grammatical question: why do the grammatical differences
between indicatives and subjunctives (in particular the additional
past + future morphology on the latter) result, at least for paradigm
cases like (1) and (2), in indicatives being epistemic and subjunc-
tives being metaphysical?5
For the most part, the philosophical literature on conditionals has ne-
glected this question, perhaps leaving it as a project for linguists to
figure out.6 However, philosophers thinking about conditionals ought
to be interested in the grammatical question for at least two rea-
sons. The first is that our answer to the grammatical question may
guide our thinking not only about what indicatives and subjunctives
like (1) and (2) mean, but also about the meanings of future directed
conditionals like (3):
(3) If Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else will.
Thus, thinking about the grammatical question may provide a new
way of tackling one of the major outstanding issues in the conditionals
literature: the question of whether future indicative conditionals like
5. Although this is a robust generalization, as we will see below in §2, the inter-
action between indicative/subjunctive and epistemic/metaphysical is slightly
more complicated. In particular, indicatives about the future seem to have both
epistemic and metaphysical interpretations, and subjunctives about the past
seem to have both epistemic and metaphysical interpretations. The correct gen-
eralization seems to be that conditionals with future outlooks (either from now,
or the perspective of some past time) have both interpretations, while condi-
tionals with non-future outlooks have only epistemic interpretations.
6. For instance, two philosophical treatises on conditionals, Lewis (1973) and
Bennett (2003), are entirely devoted to characterizing a semantics for a formal
operator that is intended to gloss a certain class of English sentences, but spend
little time worrying about the relation between that operator and the English
sentences it is intended to gloss. Gibbard (1981) devotes time to the discussion
of the grammatical differences and their corresponding semantic differences
(pp. 222–226), but offers no account of the relation between them. Even Lycan
(2001), who is admirably sensitive to syntactic data (see especially pp. 1–15),
says nothing illuminating about (ii) (pp. 143–148). Exceptions include Stalnaker
(1975), Dudman (1983), Edgington (1995), Weatherson (2001).
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(3) are metaphysical or epistemic.7 As we will see in §2, my answer
to the grammatical question generates predictions about the mean-
ings of future conditionals, predictions which I will argue are correct.
The second reason to be interested in the grammatical question is
that Iatridou’s observation, which is that many unrelated languages
use past tense to express metaphysical modality, seems to call for a
nonconventional explanation (that is, one that does not merely appeal
to what the relevant expressions in these languages mean) — more on
what such an explanation might look like below.
Iatridou’s own answer to the grammatical question is that the
extra layer of past tense on a subjunctive conditional carries a modal
distancing (rather than temporal distancing, as past tense usually does)
effect. It signals that the speaker is talking about worlds potentially
different from those compatible with what is presupposed; hence such
theories may predict that subjunctive conditionals quantify over nearby
metaphysically accessible worlds, while indicatives quantify over epis-
temically accessible worlds, thus capturing the relevant difference in
meaning between them. Call this the modal past hypothesis, since it
proposes that past tense has a modal meaning certain environments.8
Although the modal past hypothesis promises a straightforward
answer to the grammatical question, there are reasons for con-
cern. As noted above, a nonconventional explanation of Iatridou’s
observation would be preferable, given that it encompasses a wide
range of unrelated languages. On the modal past hypothesis, it re-
mains unclear why these unrelated languages would all lexically en-
7. See for instance Davis (1979), Gibbard (1981), Ellis (1984), Dudman (1984,
1994, 2000), Bennett (1988, 1995, 2003), Jackson (1990, 1991), Edgington (1995),
Cogan (1996), Barker (1998), Cross (2002), Morton (2004), Gauker (2006),
DeRose (2010), Barnett (2012). Note that it is common in this part of the lit-
erature to find the labels “indicative” and “subjunctive” (or “counterfactual”)
used to mark the semantic distinction which I use “epistemic”/“metaphysical”
for.
8. See Iatridou (2000), who draws on Isard (1974), Lyons (1977); recent defend-
ers of this line include Starr (2013), Schulz (2014).
code ‘modal/temporal distancing’ in past tense morphology. Further-
more, the modal past hypothesis raises the question why past tense
morphology lexically encodes temporal and modal distancing, but not
spatial distancing. And finally, it remains mysterious on the modal
past hypothesis why it is a combination of past + future morphology
that we find on subjunctive conditionals cross-linguistically. Here, the
modal past-theorist could just say that the future morphology conven-
tionally licenses the modal reading of past tense, but this brings us back
to issue of cross-linguistic robustness which remains unexplained.9
The goal of this paper is to defend a nonconventional answer to
the grammatical question. My theory will comprise four main prin-
ciples:
1. simple past: the extra layer of past tense on subjunctives shifts the
evaluation time of the conditional to the past (cf. Tedeschi [1981],
Dudman [1983, 1984, 1988], Edgington [1995], Ippolito [2003, 2006,
2013] [2013], Arregui [2005, 2007, 2009]).10
2. uniformity: modals and conditionals have a uniform modal seman-
tics and what interpretation they have depends (in part) on what
modal base they are assigned in context (cf. Kratzer [1977]).
9. See also Mackay (2015) for an empirical challenge to modal past theories.
10. Although some of these simple past theories address important related
questions about the relationship between the grammatical differences of indica-
tive and subjunctive conditionals and their semantic properties, none as far as
I know aim to account for the philosophically intriguing generalization noted
in the grammatical question. For instance, Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013b) aims
to account for differences in the implicatures and presupposition projection
properties of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Since she does not dis-
cuss past indicatives like (1), her theory is silent about the semantic difference
between (1) and (2). Arregui (2007, 2009) proposes a unified theory of subjunc-
tive conditionals about the past and the future, offering a simple past theory
on which the past tense plays a role in fixing the similarity relation on coun-
terfactuals. However, she notes (Arregui (2007), p. 245) that by building the
meaning of subjunctive conditionals into the meaning of “would” her theory
is not designed to make predictions regarding the semantic difference between
conditionals like If John left at noon, he will be sitting outside right now and If John
had left at noon, he would have been sitting outside now.
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3. dual interpretations: there are two kinds of modal
bases — metaphysical and epistemic — differing only in that
present metaphysical possibilities all share the same past, while
present epistemic possibilities may have different pasts (cf. Kratzer
[1981, 1991]).
4. diversity: there is a constraint on the assignment of modal bases to
modals and conditionals in context which ensures that conditionals
are never interpreted such that their consequents are directly settled
by their modal base (cf. Condoravdi [2002]).
I use these principles to derive the semantic contrast between indica-
tive and subjunctive conditionals from their grammatical differences;
the basic idea is that we use the past + future morphology on subjunc-
tives to ‘access’ past metaphysical possibilities (ways the world could
have been) which we otherwise could not quantify over given diver-
sity.11 As a result, my theory entails a version of the view that sub-
junctive conditionals quantify over alternative futures from some past
branch from actuality.12
§1 comprises the statement of the main theory. In §2, I explore how
the theory generalizes, and there I argue that two surprising predic-
tions it makes — that past subjunctives and future indicatives can have
both metaphysical and epistemic interpretations — are correct. Finally,
11. Such an explanation does not entail that metaphysical modality is expressed
using past tense morphology in every language. Thus, it’s compatible with this
explanation that some languages use other means (besides tense morphology)
for making claims about the past (e.g., Chinese, Burmese, and Dyirbal — see
Comrie [1985]). It entails only that some such means of identifying a past
evaluation time will be involved in quantifying over metaphysical possibilities
which differ from how things actually are or were. Interestingly, the question of
whether Chinese has any consistent linguistic form for expressing metaphysi-
cal conditionals is controversial (see in particular Bloom [1981], Comrie [1986]),
but recent work has suggested that even in Chinese past-markers play an im-
portant role in expressing metaphysical conditionals (Feng & Yi [2006], Liu
[2013], Yong [2013]).
12. Cf. Jackson (1977), Thomason & Gupta (1980), Thomason (1985), Tedeschi
(1981), Bennett (2003), Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013b), Placek & Müller (2007), Ar-
regui (2007, 2009).
in §3, I anticipate and respond to some pressing objections regarding
my use of historical modality to capture the truth conditions of sub-
junctive conditionals. I conclude with a brief discussion about some
remaining open issues.
1. Why Indicatives and Subjunctives Differ in Meaning
In this section, I motivate my answer to the grammatical question,
focusing for now on the Oswald minimal pair:
(1) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did. Indicative
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have. Sub-
junctive
Adopting the simple past hypothesis, I suppose that the extra layer
of past tense on subjunctives is an ordinary past tense that shifts the
evaluation time of the conditional to the past. Following Palmer (1986),
Abusch (1997, 1998), Ogihara (1996), I’ll suppose that “would” is the
past tense of “will” (following the usual convention to refer to un-
tensed “will” using “WOLL”) and it shifts the event time of its clause
to the future.13 Drawing on Kratzer (1986, 1991, 2012), I assume that the
logical form of a conditional sentence involves its if-clause restricting
the domain of a covert necessity modal, which has its consequent as
its nuclear scope.14 Finally, following Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013b), Ar-
regui (2009), I assume that (at the relevant level of abstraction) the log-
ical form of subjunctive conditionals like (2) has this restricted covert
13. This future-shifting effect of “will”/“would” is optional when combined
with stative verbs. For instance, John will be in his room can mean either that
John is now in his room or that John will be in his room at some salient future
time. We’ll come back to this point in §3.
14. Nothing crucially hinges on this for our purposes; I do so only to empha-
size the analogous behavior with other modal expressions. We could just as
easily rewrite our semantics using a conditional operator in place of the covert
modal. Furthermore, the choice of necessity modal is also unnecessary for our
purposes — our aim here would be just as well served by letting the covert
modal element be a selection function that takes the evaluation world into a
unique world in which the if-clause is true (cf. Stalnaker [1975, 1980]).
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modal embedded under a higher past tense operator (let ‘2’ denote
the covert modal operator):15
(2)
PAST
2
PAST S
Oswald not shoot Kennedy
PAST
WOLL S
Someone else shoot Kennedy
That the indicative (1) lacks an extra layer of past tense indicates
that the conditional is not embedded under a higher past tense
(even though both its antecedent and consequent are past-tensed). I’ll
assume that it is not embedded under any tense (although I’ll leave it
open whether it is in fact embedded under a present tense), and thus
that it has the following structure (at the relevant level of abstraction):
15. Although Kratzer takes the covert modal to always be epistemic, on my pro-
posal this need not be so, as we will see shortly. Furthermore, to streamline the
presentation of the theory, I will be ignoring the past tense on the conditionals’
antecedents and consequents. I go into more detail in the Appendix.
(1)
2
PAST S
Oswald not shoot Kennedy
PAST S
Someone else shoot Kennedy
These are just our starting assumptions given the simple past hypoth-
esis, but I want to show that they are not unmotivated. As a prelimi-
nary motivation for our starting point, consider the following pair of
modals:
(4) It is possible that John won the election. Epistemic
(5) It was possible that John would win the election. Metaphysical
(4) and (5) differ semantically in a way that is analogous to (1) and
(2). Suppose the election results are in but we haven’t heard them
yet, so we don’t yet know whether John won — then we might say (4)
to express that it is compatible with our knowledge or evidence that
John won. Thus, its meaning is epistemic, just like the indicative (1).
Suppose later we find out that John didn’t win the election — now we
might say (5) to express that the election wasn’t rigged (that perhaps
it was unsettled at some past time whether John would win). Thus, its
meaning is metaphysical, just like the subjunctive (2).16 Furthermore,
16. We find the same grammatical/semantic difference in modal auxiliaries. (i)
is ambiguous:
(i) John might have won the election.
On one reading, it means something akin to (4) and on the other, something
akin to (5). It also has a less prominent reading in which it reports a past time
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(4) and (5) wear their grammatical differences on their sleeves: (4)
is a present-tensed possibility claim about the past, whereas (5) is a
past-tensed possibility claim about the future (from that past time).
That is, (4) very plausibly has the following structure:
(4)
PRESENT
3
PAST S
John win the election
while (5) very plausibly has the following structure:
(5)
PAST
3
PAST
WOLL S
John win the election
The grammatical/semantic analogy between (4)/(5) and (1)/(2) is
at which it was epistemically possible that John won the election. I’ll discuss
this reading further in §2.1. This ambiguity is an instance of the pattern above
if John might have won the election is structurally ambiguous between a reading
in which “might” falls in the scope of past tense or not:
(ii) John might have won the election.
a. Might[Past[John won the election]] Epistemic
b. Past[Might[John won the election]] Metaphysical
See Condoravdi (2002) for further discussion.
striking, and thus motivates a theory on which (1) and (4) (and (2) and
(5)) have roughly analogous tense structures, which give rise to their
analogous semantic differences. Explaining why this happens is the
goal of the remainder of §1. I begin in the next section by sketching a
baseline semantics which I use to state my theory of why indicatives
and subjunctives mean different things.
1.1 A Baseline Semantics
Given my assumptions, conditionals are restricted necessity modals
that may (in the case of subjunctive conditionals) take scope under
past tense. The baseline semantic theory I’ll be working with will
be a slightly amended version of Kratzer’s influential semantics for
modals (see Kratzer [1977, 1981, 1991, 2012]). On this theory, modal
and conditional domains are determined by two conversational
backgrounds, a modal base f and an ordering source g, both functions
from worlds and times to sets of propositions (trading perspicuity for
precision, I’ll use “modal base” and “ordering source” to refer both to
the function delivering the set of propositions and the output of the
function as evaluated at a particular world; it will be clear from the
context which is intended).17 The set of propositions delivered by the
ordering source, g(w, t), orders the worlds in ∩ f (w, t) according to
how closely they come to approximating the ideal given by g(w, t), as
follows:
Def 1 (Orderings). ∀u, v ∈ ∩ f (w, t) : u ≤g(w,t) v iff
. {p ∈ g(w, t) : v ∈ p} ⊆ {p ∈ g(w, t) : u ∈ p}
Read ‘u ≤g(w,t) v’ as saying that u is as good as v given ideal g(w, t).
In English, the above condition holds iff all of the g(w, t)-propositions
that are true at v are also true at u. Making the limit assumption, we
17. I am assuming throughout that propositions are simply sets of possible
worlds. Since we’re only concerned with the modal profile of sentences, this
assumption is harmless for our purposes.
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can then define the domain of a modal relative to f and g (at w, t) via
the following function D:18
Def 2 (Domains). The domain of modalM given f , g at w, t is
D( f , g, w, t) = {u ∈ ∩ f (w, t) : ∀v ∈ ∩ f (w, t) : u ≤g(w,t) v})
Basically, the domain of a modal is the set of worlds compatible with
its modal base that are as good (given its ordering source) as any
other in that modal base, hence the label ‘best.’ We then state our
schematic semantics for modals by analyzing them as quantifiers over
their domains, as follows:19,20
modal semantics
2(p) is true relative to f , g, w, t iff ∀w′ ∈ D( f , g, w, t) : w′ ∈ p
3(p) is true relative to f , g, w, t iff ∃w′ ∈ D( f , g, w, t) : w′ ∈ p
These conditions say roughly that 2(p) is true iff all the best worlds
are p-worlds, and 3(p) is true iff some of the best worlds are p-worlds.
Call the sentence p as it appears in the scope of the modal operator its
prejacent. I’ll also use this term to refer to the proposition expressed
by that sentence (the distinction won’t matter for our purposes). Here,
I will follow Kratzer in holding that conditionals are just restricted
necessity modals. We implement this view by assuming that an
18. This is not an ad hoc division of labor. Those familiar with ordering (cf.
Stalnaker [1968], Lewis [1973]) semantics for counterfactuals can think of g(w, t)
as inducing an order and selecting only the “closest” worlds given that order
in ∩ f (w, t). Kratzer’s own motivation for such a two-factor semantics is its
treatment of comparative possibility claims (cf. Kratzer [1991, 2012]).
19. We’re assuming that it is the logical forms of sentences which are inter-
preted. We assume that ‘2(p)’ is the logical form of a necessity modal sen-
tence (that is, any instance of the sentence schema ‘It must be the case that p’)
and ‘3(p)’ is the logical form of a possibility modal sentence (instances of the
schema ‘it might be the case that p’).
20. I will focus entirely on sentences containing at most a single
modal/conditional for the scope of this paper to simplify the discussion. We
could overcome this limitation by indexing conversational backgrounds to
modals.
indicative conditional pif p, qq has as its logical form [2p](q), and that
its truth conditions are given by:
conditional semantics
[2p](q) is true relative to f , g, w, t iff 2(q) is true relative to
f [p], g, w, t. (Where ∀w, t : f [p](w, t) = f (w, t) ∪ {p})
This says roughly that [2p](q) is true iff all the best p-worlds are q-
worlds.
Finally, we define the proposition expressed by a sentence in a
context as follows (cf. Ninan [2011]):
Def 3 (Propositions). For any sentence p, the proposition expressed
by p in context c = {w : p is true relative to fc, gc, w, tc}.
(Where p is the logical form of p, and fc, gc, tc are the modal base,
ordering source, and time that c determines the sentence to be eval-
uated relative to.)
Since the logical form of an indicative conditional has a modal which is
not in the scope of any tense, we predict that the conversational back-
grounds for indicatives are evaluated at tc (which is the time of the
context of utterance). Since subjunctive conditionals involve modals
embedded under past tense, we predict that the conversational back-
grounds for subjunctives are evaluated at the relevant past time rather
than the evaluation time of the entire sentence (see the Appendix for a
way of compositionally integrating tense into the semantics).
This concludes the sketch of our baseline semantic framework. It
should be clear at this point that the framework will not by itself
predict the difference in meaning between indicative and subjunctive
conditionals, since it doesn’t predict what conversational backgrounds
indicatives and subjunctives will be interpreted relative to in various
contexts (indeed, this question is left open by Kratzer’s own work on
modals and conditionals as well). My point in sketching this baseline
semantics is to provide a framework within which we may precisely
philosophers’ imprint - 7 - vol. 15, no. 32 (december, 2015)
justin khoo On indicative and subjunctive conditionals
state a theory that does explain why the combination of past + future
morphology in subjunctive conditionals results in their meaning
something different from their indicative counterparts. The rest of this
section is devoted to articulating and motivating my answer to the
grammatical question. In §1.2 I motivate the two key assumptions
of my theory, which I will use to predict the semantic contrast between
(1) and (2) in §1.3. I round out the section in §1.4 by highlighting how
my theory generalizes beyond the Adams’ minimal pair.
1.2 A Pragmatic Constraint
Given our semantic framework, the key to predicting the semantic con-
trast between conditionals like (1) and (2) is a suitable constraint on
the assignment of modal bases and ordering sources to modals and
conditionals in context. In what follows, I only discuss a constraint on
the modal base assigned by context, and set aside ordering sources
for now.21 My first assumption is that there are two distinct kinds of
modal bases — informational and historical — and that a modal or con-
ditional has an epistemic reading if interpreted relative to an informa-
tional modal base and a metaphysical reading if interpreted relative
to a historical modal base.22 An informational modal base f I takes a
world and time into the set of true propositions that are the content
of some particular body of information at that world and time (such
as the what is known by a particular agent). A historical modal base
21. However, keep in mind that the ordering source plays a crucial role in
modal semantics — see the discussion in Kratzer (2012), pp. 32–37. I discuss
ordering sources in §3.4.
22. See also Kratzer (1981)’s discussion of circumstantial and epistemic modal
bases (p. 49–55; pagination from Kratzer (2012)), which she once thought might
play a role in accounting for some of the syntactic and semantic differences be-
tween root and epistemic modals (cf. Hofmann [1966], Perlmutter [1971], Ross
[1969], Jackendoff [1972], Groenendijk & Stokhof [1975], Iatridou [1990]). How-
ever she has since abandoned this project (cf. Kratzer [2012]: p. 23–24) since
circumstantial and epistemic modal bases are not sufficiently different to ac-
count for the root/epistemic distinction. However, informational and historical
modal bases might actually be what is needed here — although defending this
claim is a project for another day.
fH takes a world w and time t into the set of propositions true at w
that are about states or events that do not continue beyond t. Hence,
historical modal bases may be defined as follows:23
necessity of the past:
For any world w, time t, and proposition p about an interval that
doesn’t extend beyond t: p ∈ fH(w, t) iff p is true at w.
∩ fH(w, t) is the set of historical possibilities at w, t: a set of worlds that
are exactly intrinsically alike w at all times up until t while possibly
differing thereafter, as in the following diagram:
t1 t2 t3 t4
• w1
• w2
• •
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
C •
zzzzzzzzz
DD
DD
DD
DD
D • w
• w3
• w4
23. I discuss the notion of a proposition being about an interval in more detail
in §1.4 and in the Appendix (see also Lewis [1980, 1988a,b], Thomason [2002]).
For now, hopefully the following intuitive understanding will suffice: the in-
terval a proposition is about is the interval throughout which the event/state
it describes takes place. Also, I recognize that some propositions may not be
about any particular intervals — this is a point I will return to in §1.4.
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Here, w, w1, w2, w3, w4 ∈ fH(w, t1) but only w, w2, w3 ∈ fH(w, t3).
Hence, historical possibilities decrease as time goes on — what was
once historically possible may not now be historically possible, and
what is now historically possible was always historically possible.
Recall that we aim to predict the semantic contrast between (1) and
(2) by way of a constraint on which modal base (informational or his-
torical) a conditional will be interpreted relative to in a given context.
Following Condoravdi (2002)’s explanation of a similar contrast in epis-
temic and metaphysical possibility modals, I propose the following
constraint:24,25
diversity:
In any context c, the modal base fc for any modalM with prejacent
p and modal time t must be such that: ∃w ∈ C : p 6∈ fc(w, t) and
¬p 6∈ fc(w, t).
(where C is the context set of c, the set of worlds compatible with
what is common ground among the participants of c; cf. Stalnaker
[1978, 2002])
24. See also von Fintel (1997a)’s principle of “consequent variety” (which also
appears as a felicity condition in Kratzer [1978]), and Werner (2006)’s “disparity
principle.” A similar principle is suggested in von Fintel & Heim (2012), in
the context of a discussion of the “Paradox of the Good Samaritan” (pp. 62–
63). Each of these constraints (including Condoravdi’s) demand that ∩ f (w, t)
contain both p- and ¬p-worlds. My diversity principle is stated at the level of
propositions, and hence entails these.
25. One defensive remark about diversity. Since it is an intensional constraint,
if the modal’s prejacent is a necessary truth, then, assuming that there are no
impossible worlds, no modal base will satisfy diversity for that modal, and
thus the theory would predict such sentences to be infelicitous. We can avoid
this problem by positing impossible worlds (cf. Nolan [1997], Kment [2006a,b],
Krakauer [2012], Brogaard & Salerno [2013]), or by reformulating diversity
to be conditional on there being some possible worlds in which the nuclear
scope of the modal is true and some possible worlds in which the nuclear
scope is false. One reason to favor the latter strategy is that we predict the
possibility of expressing eternal metaphysical necessities using simple, present
tensed modal constructions, as in: It is necessary that 2+2 = 4. This sentence may
have a metaphysical flavor, it seems, and assuming diversity is a conditional
constraint as above would allow my theory to predict this fact.
Basically, diversity demands that nether a modal’s prejacent nor the
negation of its prejacent be among the propositions in the modal
base assigned to it by any context (remember, since we are treating
conditionals as restricted modals, the prejacent of a conditional is
its consequent). The reason it is stated in terms of the worlds in the
context set rather than the actual world is that our intuitions about
the relevant readings track what is presupposed in the conversa-
tion, not what in fact holds (cf. Condoravdi [2002] on differences
between metaphysical and epistemic interpretations of future oriented
might-claims on pp. 79–80). We’ll see in §1.3 how my theory uses
necessity of the past + diversity to predict the semantic contrast
between (1) and (2). However, first I want to argue that diversity
is independently motivated on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Theoretical motivation for diversity
Start with the following natural thought:
contextual equivalence ban:
If possible, simple modal sentences will not express propositions
that are contextually equivalent (true at all the same worlds in the
context set) to their prejacents.
This principle seems correct, and may be an instance of a more
general policy to aim to interpret strictly more complex sentences
so that they are not contextually equivalent with their strictly less
complex counterparts. The more general policy may itself be the
motivated and explained by considerations of speech economy (see for
instance Zipf [1949], Horn [1984, 1989, 1993], Clark [1987], Goldstein
[2013]). Since contextual equivalence ban is reasonable, I won’t
explore these further motivations for it at this time. Importantly for
our purposes is the fact that contextual equivalence ban entails
diversity, since diversity is a minimal condition for the contextual
equivalence ban to hold (see Appendix for the proof). Therefore, we
have an independent theoretical argument for diversity from general
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considerations about considerations of speech economy.26 We turn
next to an independent empirical argument for diversity.
Empirical motivation for diversity
Karttunen (1972) observes that epistemic necessity modal claims seem
to be weaker in some sense than their prejacents, in that the former
seem acceptable only if it is clear in the context that the speaker intends
to have inferred the prejacent from some other information (hence that
the prejacent is not known “directly”). This is illustrated by the follow-
ing minimal pair:
(6) [Said while watching it rain]:
a. It’s raining.
b. #It must be raining.
(7) [Said while watching people come inside with wet umbrellas]:
a. It’s raining.
b. It must be raining.
Kratzer (1991) proposes to model this weakness by holding that the
domain of “must” may exclude the actual world if it receives a non-
factive ordering source — hence pmust pq is weaker than p in that it
does not entail p. von Fintel & Gillies (2010) argue, pace Kratzer, that
“must” is strong — epistemic necessity claims entail their prejacents.27
26. Condoravdi (2002) (p. 83) hints at such a motivation for her “Diversity”
principle in her argument that without it, context could assign a historical
modal base to (i-a), which, given necessity of the past, would make it
necessarily equivalent to (i-b):
(i) a. John may be next door.
b. John is next door.
27. von Fintel & Gillies (2010) offer several compelling arguments for this claim.
One is that if pmust pq does not entail p, then the following sentences
should be consistent, but they are intuitively not:
(i) a. #It must be raining but perhaps it isn’t raining.
b. #Perhaps it isn’t raining but it must be.
Their alternative explanation of the contrast between (6) and (7) is that
“must” carries an evidential signal of indirect inference, so that even
though pmust pq entails p, it also signals that p is not directly known.
Hence, von Fintel & Gillies predict that (6) will be infelicitous, since in
that case it is directly known that it is raining; but they predict that (7)
will be felicitous because in that case it is only indirectly known (via
inference) that it is raining.
But why do epistemic necessity modals signal indirect inference?
von Fintel and Gillies predict this property of epistemic necessity
modals by way of the following two assumptions (pp. 371–372): (i)
epistemic modals lexically select for informational modal bases that
contain only propositions that are directly known by the relevant party
(von Fintel and Gillies’ terminology is slightly different: they talk about
the kernel but this just is an epistemic modal base; see von Fintel &
Gillies [2010], fn. 31),28 and (ii) an epistemic necessity modal sentence
is defined (in a context) only if neither its prejacent nor the negation of
its prejacent is a member of its modal base (this follows von Fintel and
Gillies’ first implementation of “directly settles,” see pp. 374–376; they
officially remain neutral on choosing between this implementation and
an another). Together, (i) and (ii) entail that epistemic necessity modals
signal that their prejacents are not directly known: given (i), the modal
base of an epistemic necessity modal comprises the propositions that
are directly known by the relevant party, but then from (ii) it follows
that for the epistemic necessity modal claim to be defined (and hence
28. This claim is compatible with Kratzer (2012)’s examples of epistemic modal
claims that are relativized to evidence whose content is unknown, such as
the information contained in some document in a locked filing cabinet. We
may handle such examples by letting the ordering source of the modal be con-
strained by the content of the document in the filing cabinet, similar to Kratzer
(2012)’s suggestion on p. 34, fn. 6.
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felicitous), it must be the case that neither its prejacent nor the nega-
tion of its prejacent is directly known.29 However, both (i) and (ii) are
strong lexical assumptions, and von Fintel and Gillies admit that they
are not entirely satisfied with stipulating them (p. 368).
However, notice that (ii) follows from diversity. Thus, adopting di-
versity removes the need to stipulate (ii) lexically. Assuming a method-
ology on which deriving principles pragmatically rather than lexically
stipulating them is generally preferred, then insofar as von Fintel and
Gillies’ theory is well-supported, the fact that (ii) follows from diver-
sity provides some independent evidence in favor of diversity.30
Thus, we’ve motivated diversity on both independent theoretical
and empirical grounds — it is not an ad hoc assumption of the theory.
In the next section, I will use diversity to predict the semantic contrast
between (1) and (2).
1.3 Predicting the Observations
In this section, I show that, given necessity of the past and diversity,
my theory predicts that (1) is epistemic and that (2) may be metaphys-
ical (though, also that it need not be).
(1) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
Indicative
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
Subjunctive
29. We need the constraint that both that the prejacent is not in f (w, t) nor its
negation in f (w, t) since the same contrast arises for negated epistemic possi-
bility claims, e.g., It can’t be raining.
30. Given this methodology, it would also be preferred to have a general prag-
matic motivation for (i) — especially, as von Fintel and Gillies note (p. 368),
given that epistemic necessity modals signal indirect inference across a wide
range of languages. I do not have any such general motivation in hand. How-
ever, it is not the aim of my paper to find a non-arbitrary implementation of
von Fintel and Gillies’ theory. Rather, my point in this section is merely to show
how adopting diversity is a step in the right direction, lessening a plausible
theory’s commitment to lexical stipulations.
necessity of the past:
For any world w, time t, and proposition p about an interval that
doesn’t extend beyond t: p ∈ fH(w, t) iff p is true at w.
diversity:
In any context c, the modal base fc for any modalM with prejacent
p and modal time t must be such that: ∃w ∈ C : p 6∈ fc(w, t) and
¬p 6∈ fc(w, t).
Here is how we predict that (1) is epistemic. Since it is indicative, it is
evaluated at the present time, t. But its consequent is about the past.
Therefore, if (1) were to receive a historical modal base fH , by neces-
sity of the past either its consequent proposition would be among
fH(w, t) or the negation of its consequent proposition would be among
fH(w, t). But either way would result in a violation of diversity. Since
there is no principle analogous to necessity of the past constrain-
ing informational modal bases, no such trouble arises there. Hence we
predict that, if interpretable at all, (1) must be epistemic.
Here is how we predict that (2) may be metaphysical. Since it is
subjunctive, it is evaluated at some relevant past time t′. But its con-
sequent is about a time to the future of that past time. Thus, were it
to receive a historical modal base fH , it may still be the case (even in
light of necessity of the past) that neither its consequent proposition
nor the negation of its consequent proposition is among fH(w, t′). In
such a case diversity would not be violated, and thus we predict that
(2) may be metaphysical. But by the same reasoning as above, we also
predict that (2) may be epistemic. We’ll come back to this surprising
prediction in §2.1. For now, let’s set it aside.
We have now seen that adopting necessity of the past + diversity
is sufficient to predict a semantic contrast between (1) and (2), albeit
perhaps not quite the contrast we expected. To get a sense of just
how different the predicted meanings of (1) and (2) (at least on its
metaphysical interpretation) are, consider the following intuitive
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glosses on their predicted truth conditions:31
(1) is true iff all the presently epistemically accessible worlds in which
Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy are worlds in which someone else did.
(2) is true (on its metaphysical interpretation) iff (where t′ is the
relevant past time) all the (best) historically accessible worlds from t′
in which Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy are worlds in which someone
else shoots Kennedy.
Indeed, our predicted truth conditions match our intuition that (1) is
true because we now know that someone shot Kennedy, and match
our intuition that (2) is false because (assuming the Warren report is
true) there were no reliable backup plans in place for someone else to
step in were Oswald to fail (thus ensuring that some of the best past
historically accessible worlds at which Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy
are ones in which no one does).
Let’s recap what we’ve shown so far. Adopting the simple past hy-
pothesis along with the assumption that there are just two modal bases
(historical ones governed by necessity of the past and informational
ones which are not), along with diversity, leads us to predict that in-
dicative conditionals whose consequents are about the past, such as (1),
will be epistemic, while subjunctive conditionals whose consequents
are about the future from some relevant past time, such as (2), can be
metaphysical. Furthermore, our predicted interpretations allow for (1)
to be true and (2) false, even in the same context. Thus, we predict the
semantic contrast between (1) and (2).
However, the reader may have noticed that my theory generalizes
beyond the Adams’ minimal pair, and hence wonder what it predicts
31. Remember, we haven’t yet seen the role played by the ordering source g in
determining these truth conditions. For now I just want to emphasize that we
can predict necessity modals to be true in light of diversity, since even though
the modal’s prejacent can never be among its modal base, this doesn’t preclude
its prejacent being true at every world in its domain D( f , g, w, t).
for modals and conditionals generally. I turn to answer this question
in the next section, showing that the theory makes two very surprising
predictions: that subjunctive conditionals can actually have epistemic
interpretations (as we’ve already seen) and that future directed
indicative conditionals can have both epistemic and metaphysical
interpretations.
1.4 Beyond the Adams Minimal Pair
Recall the notion of the time that a proposition is about. I intend this
notion to track our intuitions about the interval throughout which the
state or event described by the proposition takes place (for a defini-
tion of the time of a clause which connects up with the time of the
proposition expressed by that clause, see the Appendix). Consider for
instance:
(8) a. John is upstairs.
b. John was upstairs.
The time of the proposition expressed by (8-a) is intuitively the time
at which the utterance takes place, tc. The time of the proposition ex-
pressed by (8-b) is some interval that is entirely to the past of tc. I
assume that sentences like (8-a)/(8-b) express different propositions
in different contexts, and hence exactly which intervals the propo-
sitions they express are about will also depend on context.32 Now,
32. Of course, there are sentences which express propositions that are not about
any particular time, such as:
(i) John was, is, or will be happy at some time or other.
This fact is compatible with my theory — I’ll discuss this issue in §3.3. Further-
more, I should note that this understanding of times p is about predicts that
the proposition expressed by:
(ii) John came Sunday and Sue left Saturday.
is about Sunday and Saturday, as is its disjunctive counterpart:
(iii) John came Sunday or Sue left Saturday.
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take a particular modal sentence Φ (note that Φ may be a condi-
tional — remember that on my theory conditionals are just restricted
necessity modals and hence the prejacent of a conditional sentence is
its consequent). Say that Φ’s modal time is the time at which its conver-
sational backgrounds are evaluated, and its prejacent time is the time
at which its prejacent is about. When Φ is a conditional, its prejacent
time is the time at which the proposition expressed by its consequent
is about. We assume that when a modal is not embedded under a
past tense, its modal time is identical to tc. Say that a modal sentence
is future directed just if its prejacent time is to the future of its modal
time, and that it is non-future directed otherwise. Thus, (1) is non-future
directed and (2) is future directed:
(1) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
Now I can state the predictions of my theory with full generality:
Predictions
(α) Non-future directed modals are invariably epistemic.
Examples: (1), (4)
(β) Future directed modals may be metaphysical or epistemic.
Examples: (2), (5)
We already saw the reasoning that leads to these predictions in §1.3.
For a more rigorous discussion, see the Appendix. What is important
for our purposes here is that, given that it predicts (β), my theory
predicts that subjunctives like (2) and future directed indicatives like
(3) may be both metaphysical and epistemic.
I won’t defend these additional predictions at this time, but I submit that they
are plausible.
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
(3) If Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else will.
I will address these two predictions of the theory in §2, and argue
that both predictions are in fact correct. Furthermore, I will argue that
the default interpretation of subjunctive conditionals is metaphysical.
Then, in §3, I will address three potential problems for my theory aris-
ing from its prediction that the metaphysical interpretation of subjunc-
tive conditionals involves historical modality. In particular, I will look
at problems stemming from backwards subjunctive conditionals, sub-
junctives with antecedents and consequents about no time in particular,
and subjunctives in hindsight (cf. Tichý [1976], Slote [1978], Edgington
[2004]).
2. Additional Predictions
For any conditional sentence whose consequent is about a time partly
to the future of its modal time, as with subjunctive conditionals like
(2) and indicative conditionals with future-oriented consequents like
(3), my theory allows that context assign that conditional either an
informational modal base or a historical modal base.
(3) If Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else will.
Hence, my theory predicts that such conditionals ought to have
epistemic and metaphysical interpretations (in principle). In the next
two sections, I motivate this prediction.
2.1 Epistemic Subjunctives
We predict that subjunctive conditionals like (2) are in principle am-
biguous between a metaphysical reading and an epistemic reading. In
this section, I argue that this is the right prediction. Furthermore, I
argue that the default interpretation of subjunctives like (2) is meta-
physical.
In fact, epistemic readings of subjunctives have already been no-
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ticed, though dismissed as an oddity.33 Edgington (2007) gives the fol-
lowing example (borrowed from Grice [1989]):
Treasure hunt. “There is a treasure hunt. The organizer tells me:
(9) I’ll give you a hint: it’s either in the attic or the garden.
Trusting the speaker, I think
(10) If it’s not in the attic, it’s in the garden.
We are competing in pairs: I go to the attic and tip off my partner to
search the garden. I discover the treasure. ‘Why did you tell me to
go to the garden?’ she asks.
(11) Because if it hadn’t been in the attic it would have been in
the garden: that’s what I was told. (Or more pedantically:
‘that’s what I inferred from what I was told’)
That doesn’t sound wrong in the context.” Edgington (2007), p. 212.
Notice that, in this context, (11) seems to have an epistemic reading:
the speaker infers it from (10) — thus, it’s an instance of the direct argu-
ment (p or q, therefore, if not-p, q).34 The truth of (11) does not depend
on any causal relation between the treasure not being hidden in the
attic and its being hidden in the garden — for instance the intentions
of the treasure-hider. Rather, its truth depends entirely on whether the
disjunction (10) was known at the relevant past time. In other words,
(11) would still be true even if the treasure-hider would not have hid-
den the treasure anywhere besides the attic. The epistemic reading
33. For discussions of other purported epistemic readings of subjunctive con-
ditionals, see Veltman (2005), Schulz (2007), Kratzer (2012). I’m not sure about
the examples Schulz points to, for the reasons Kratzer gives.
34. The direct argument appears valid for paradigm epistemic conditionals like
(1) but not for paradigm metaphysical conditionals like (2). See Stalnaker (1975),
Jackson (1979) for further discussion.
here may be paraphrased along the following lines: given what I knew
then (after receiving the hint from the organizer but before finding the
treasure), had the treasure not been in the attic, it had to have been
in the garden. Notice that, after we’ve learned that the treasure is in
the attic, we cannot felicitously assert (10) — hence, (10) is not a way
of conveying this fact about our past epistemic state, though (11) is.
This is no mere quirk, either. Edgington gives another example: “‘Why
did you hold Smith for questioning?’ ‘Because we knew the crime was
committed by either Jones or Smith — if it hadn’t been Jones, it would
have been Smith.’” (Edgington [2007], p. 213). As with (11), here, we
have a claim about past epistemic possibilities — at that time, all of the
not-Jones possibilities were Smith-possibilities.
I’ll support the claim that there is a genuine epistemic reading of
some subjunctive conditionals by arguing against an alternative ac-
count of the non-standard interpretations sketched above.35 On this al-
ternative account, the non-standard interpretations are still metaphysi-
cal, but, for some reason, we hold fixed more than usual in evaluating
them. Thus, for instance, on what I’ve called its “epistemic” interpreta-
tion, when evaluating (11) we hold fixed that the treasure was hidden
somewhere, while on what I’ve called its “metaphysical” reading we
don’t hold fixed that the treasure was hidden somewhere. But what
motivates this difference in what gets held fixed? A possible answer
is that the non-standard interpretations are analogous to “hindsight”
subjunctives (which I will discuss in more detail in §3). To illustrate
a relevant hindsight subjunctive, consider the following situation: Sue
bets that a random coin toss will land tails, and it in fact lands heads.
We think:
(12) If Sue had bet on heads, she would have won.
35. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion here.
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For this to be true, in evaluating it, we seem to hold fixed the out-
come of the coin toss. On this first answer, the “epistemic” reading
of (11) is like this. However, this proposal immediately has the fol-
lowing problem: we seem to hold fixed the outcome of the toss when
evaluating (12) because the outcome of the toss is independent of its
antecedent — this is confirmed by the fact that we think that (13) is
false (in this same context):
(13) If someone else had flipped the coin, Sue would have lost.
This comes out false because we don’t hold fixed the outcome of the
toss when evaluating it, since the outcome of the toss is not indepen-
dent of (13)’s antecedent. If this is right, then the “epistemic” inter-
pretation of (11) can’t be due to holding fixed hindsight facts that are
independent of its antecedent, for the fact that the treasure was hidden
somewhere is not independent of the fact that the treasure was in the
attic; thus, hindsight subjunctives like (12) and (13) actually motivate
thinking that we do not hold fixed that the treasure was hidden some-
where in evaluating (11). So, hindsight considerations do not support
this alternative account of “epistemic” subjunctives.
Another possibility is that we hold fixed the extra fact because it
is presupposed by the antecedents of these subjunctives. Edgington’s
second example of Jones and Smith lends some plausibility to this pro-
posal, since perhaps the antecedent of “if it hadn’t been Jones, it would
have been Smith” presupposes that someone committed the crime (and
this is exactly the fact that should be held fixed to predict its “epis-
temic” interpretation). However, this account is also problematic, for
at least two reasons. The first is that (11) has an “epistemic” interpre-
tation but its antecedent does not presuppose that the treasure was
hidden somewhere. The second is that the Jones/Smith example may
also be interpreted metaphysically (such that in evaluating it we do not
hold fixed that someone committed the crime), so the presupposition
does not guarantee an “epistemic” interpretation. It seems that at best
the presupposition helps to strengthen the “epistemic” interpretation,
but by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for it.
Here is one final remark. Recall that the epistemic interpretations
admit of paraphrase using an epistemic necessity modal ((11) ≈ “given
what I knew, if the treasure hadn’t been in the attic, it had to have been
in the garden”). This is extremely telling in favor of treating them as
genuinely past-tensed epistemic necessity claims, and is not explained
by alternative theories on which they are not genuinely epistemic.
Thus, we have evidence that at least some subjunctive conditionals
are interpreted epistemically in at least some contexts. But you may
still be wondering: is there a context in which even (2), the paradigm
example of a subjunctive conditional, is interpreted epistemically?
(2) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
I think there is such a context:
Investigation. Kennedy has been shot, but we don’t know whether
he was shot on Monday or Tuesday. However, we are certain that
if Kennedy was shot on Monday, Oswald did it, but if he was shot
on Tuesday, Oswald couldn’t have done it. I send you to investigate
some of the possible Tuesday-shooters, and arrest Oswald myself.
Later, we discover that Oswald in fact shot Kennedy, so you ask,
“Why did you send me to investigate those other suspects?” and I
reply,
(14) Because if Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would
have (on Tuesday).
In this context, just as in Treasure Hunt, by uttering (2) I seem to
express something about my (our) past epistemic possibilities — thus,
even (2) seems to have an epistemic reading in the right context, and
my theory predicts this.36
36. You may have a bit of trouble getting this reading, and you might wonder
why I had to go to such lengths in describing the context to bring it out. This
is related to the fact that when eventive verbs (like “shoot”) are combined
with “will”/“would” the event time is obligatorily future-shifted, and in
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So far, so good. Past epistemic readings of subjunctive conditionals
are possible in the right contexts, and my theory predicts that they are
possible. But these readings of subjunctives are not the default ones,
and they seem to require a special context to bring them out. What
features of the context are necessary to bring out such a reading, and
why is the default interpretation of subjunctives metaphysical? First,
notice that possibility modal claims like (15) admit of past epistemic
readings:
(15) The keys might have been in the car.
von Fintel & Gillies (2008) point out that the past epistemic reading of
(15) arises in the following kind of context:
(16) A: Where are the keys?
B: They might be in the car.
A: (after checking) They’re not, why’d you say that?
B: I didn’t say they were in the car, just that they might
be — and they might have been!
This gives us a clue as to what kinds of contexts permit epistemic
readings of past modals and conditionals. The readings seem to arise
only in contexts in which the speaker is explaining (or evaluating, see
footnote 37) some past event — in Treasure Hunt, the speaker told her
confidant to check the garden because given what she knew then, if it
such conditionals we typically understand them as implying some kind
of objective (perhaps causal) relation between the events described in the
antecedent and consequent. Compare (14) with the following, which seems
to more readily take the epistemic reading in the described context:
(i) Because if Oswald hadn’t been the one that shot Kennedy, someone else
would have.
hadn’t been in the attic it would have been in the garden; in the ques-
tioning case the speaker held Smith for questioning because given what
she knew then, if the crime hadn’t been committed by Jones it would
have been committed by Smith; in the keys case, the speaker said they
might be in the car because given what she knew then they might have
been in the car; and in the modified Oswald case, the speaker said
what she did because given what she knew then, if Oswald hadn’t shot
Kennedy, someone else would have (been the shooter).37
So, why is the metaphysical interpretation of a subjunctive condi-
tional the default? We have seen that we get epistemic readings of sub-
junctives (or past modals) only in behavior-explaining/evaluating con-
texts. A possible explanation why we only get them in such contexts is
that we typically don’t care about past epistemic possibilities except in
those contexts, whereas we typically care about past metaphysical pos-
sibilities.38 The metaphysical possibilities at some time represent the
“objective options” open given various features of the world in place
at that time (for instance, the capabilities of individuals, given how
they are constituted). Thinking about such possibilities is thus useful
in planning, comparing courses of action, and so on. For instance, sup-
pose we think that if we had played zone defense, we would have won
last night’s basketball game; then we take ourselves to have a reason
to play zone defense in today’s rematch. It’s harder to think of why we
might care about past epistemic possibilities which are no longer open
37. Such readings also arise in contexts in which we are evaluating some past
behavior, as in the following example:
You close the door behind me, which automatically locks it. I rifle
through my pocket for my keys, finding them there luckily, and say,
“Still, that was stupid of you — the keys might have been inside!”
38. For a small sampling of the contexts in which we care about past meta-
physical possibilities consider: in decision contexts we care about what would
happen were we to do something (cf. Lewis [1981a,b], Stalnaker [1996]), in
assessing whether someone was morally responsible we care about whether
the person could have done otherwise (cf. Frankfurt [1969]), and in assessing
whether X harmed Y we care about how Y would have been had X not acted
as he or she did (cf. Feinberg [1992], Perry [2003]).
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possibilities (having learned something new which rules them out).
Since we know now that it didn’t rain yesterday, what’s the point of
bringing up the fact that yesterday we thought it might have been rain-
ing? One reason to talk about such possibilities might be to explain our
actions at that time — for instance, why we brought our umbrella with
us to work. But it doesn’t make sense to use such possibilities to plan
for the future or compare possible courses of action — these were epis-
temic possibilities at the time only because of our ignorance, but past
ignorance won’t (in general) be the basis for future plans or useful in
comparing courses of action. In other words, the information we have
now (though didn’t then), which rules out those past epistemic pos-
sibilities, is the information relevant to most ordinary activities (e.g.,
deciding where to go for dinner). Thus, a possible non-linguistic ex-
planation why we don’t usually get epistemic readings of subjunctive
conditionals (or modals in the prejacent of past tense) is that there are
only a few contexts (such as behavior-explaining/evaluating contexts)
in which we care about past epistemic possibilities.39
My theory predicts, correctly I have argued, that subjunctive
conditionals can in principle receive epistemic interpretations. This is
a further mark in its favor.40 In the next section, I turn to the second
39. An alternative explanation is that there are two kinds of modals, ones which
select for informational modal bases and others which select for historical
modal bases (this division is intended to map on to the observed difference
between so-called “epistemic” and “root” modals; see Coates [1983], Palmer
[1986], Brennan [1993]), and these modals differ in their syntactic projection
properties: epistemics tend to outscope quantifiers and tenses, while roots
do not (cf. Cinque [1999], Drubig [2001], Hacquard [2006]). Then, we might
account for the cases of epistemics in the scope of past tense as being in the
scope of a deleted past-inflected attitude verb, as in:
(i) I thought that if it hadn’t been Jones, it would have been Smith.
See Stephenson (2007) for a proposal of this kind for epistemic modals.
40. I should point out that modal past theories (like that of Iatridou [2000])
can make a similar prediction, so epistemic subjunctives are not a data point
favoring my theory over sophisticated modal past theories. On the latter kind
of theories, past tense morphology may be interpreted as modal in certain
environments, but need not (cf. Iatridou [2000], p. 249).
controversial prediction of my theory — that future-oriented indicative
conditionals can have both metaphysical and epistemic interpretations.
2.2 Future Indicatives
Future directed indicative conditionals are ones whose consequents are
about times to the future of their modal time (= tc):41
(3) If Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else will.
To reiterate, my theory predicts that a future directed indicative con-
ditional like (3) will have two distinct possible interpretations: one on
which it is true iff all presently epistemically possible worlds where Os-
wald doesn’t shoot Kennedy are ones in which someone else does later,
and one on which it is true iff all presently historically possible worlds
where Oswald doesn’t shoot Kennedy are ones in which someone else
does later. In this section, I’ll argue that this prediction is correct.42
My strategy will be to show that in some, but not all contexts, a
future directed indicative will be equivalent to its past directed sub-
junctive counterpart (as uttered or evaluated at a relevant later time).43
To simplify our terminology, shorten “future directed indicative con-
ditional” to “future indicative” and “past directed subjunctive condi-
41. Future-directed subjunctive conditionals come in single- and double-past
forms:
(i) a. If John took the test tomorrow, he would pass.
b. If John had taken the test tomorrow, he would have passed.
For readers interested in these subjunctives and a promising way to predict
some of their semantic differences with a simple past theory, I recommend
Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013b) (from whom I also draw the ‘one-past’, ‘two-past’
terminology). I will set aside future subjunctives for the sake of space — as we’ll
see, future indicatives already furnish us with quite a bit to talk about.
42. See Morton (2004) for additional arguments in favor of future indicatives
have both epistemic and metaphysical interpretations.
43. Bennett (2003) uses the terminology of the future indicative “standing or
falling” with its past subjunctive counterpart. For expressions of similar ideas,
see Edgington (2004), pp. 22–23, Ellis (1984) p. 54 and Dudman (1994) p. 114.
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tional” to “past subjunctive.” Given my theory, a context in which a
future indicative is equivalent to its past subjunctive counterpart (as
uttered or evaluated at a relevant later time) will be one in which it has
a metaphysical reading, since only in that case will the two be equiva-
lent (assuming they have the same conditional time and that the past
subjunctive is interpreted metaphysically). Furthermore, a context in
which a future indicative is not equivalent to its past subjunctive coun-
terpart (as uttered or evaluated at a relevant later time) will be one in
which it has an epistemic reading, since only in that case can the two
not be equivalent (assuming they have the same conditional time and
that the past subjunctive is interpreted metaphysically). Let’s use as
our target future indicative (17) and its subjunctive counterpart (18):
(17) If Sue doesn’t meet with the boss Monday, Ben will.
(18) If Sue hadn’t met with the boss Monday, Ben would have.
Here is the first context:
Meeting-1. It’s Sunday and you glance quickly at Monday’s sched-
ule of meetings. You can’t quite make out the name of the person
scheduled to meet the boss, but you are sure it either says “Sue” or
“Ben.” You thus say, “I know that either Sue or Ben will meet the
boss Monday, so if Sue doesn’t meet the boss Monday, Ben will.”
Suppose that in the world of Meeting-1 Sue meets with the boss on
Monday and there is no backup meeting scheduled. In that case, I sub-
mit that (17) is true as uttered in Meeting-1, even though (18) is false
(as uttered or evaluated on Monday after the meeting). Therefore, in
Meeting-1, whatever proposition is expressed by (17) by your utter-
ance of it on Sunday must be different from that expressed by (18) as
uttered or evaluated after Sue’s meeting. In Edgington’s terminology,
in Meeting-1, (17) doesn’t stand or fall with (18). Now consider the
second context:
Meeting-2. On Sunday you check Monday’s schedule of meetings.
You see that Sue is scheduled to meet with the boss. However, you
think that Ben is lined up for a backup meeting with the boss in case
Sue’s meeting doesn’t take place. You thus say, “Ben is scheduled as
a backup meeting in case Sue doesn’t show, so if Sue doesn’t meet
with the boss on Monday, Ben will.”
Suppose that, in the world of Meeting-2, Sue meets with the boss on
Monday, and that Ben is not scheduled for a backup meeting with
the boss in the event that Sue’s meeting doesn’t take place. In that
case, I submit that (17) is false as uttered in Meeting-2, and that (18)
is also false (as uttered or evaluated on Monday after Sue’s meeting).
Suppose instead that the world of Meeting-2 is one in which Ben is
in fact scheduled for a backup meeting with the boss in the event that
Sue’s doesn’t take place. In that case, I submit that both (17) (as uttered
in Meeting-2) and (18) (as uttered or evaluated after the meeting) are
true. Thus, it seems that in Meeting-2, (17) stands or falls with (18).44
We thus have evidence that confirms my theory’s prediction that
future-directed indicatives can have both epistemic and metaphysical
44. A similar example, related to the distinction between evidential and causal
decision theory (cf. Gibbard & Harper [1981], Lewis [1981a,b], Williamson
[2007]):
(i) a. If I choose both boxes, I will be poor.
b. If I had chosen both boxes, I would have been poor.
In the ordinary Newcomb-style puzzle, (i-a) seems true to many people simply
because the predictor is stipulated to be near-infallible. However, suppose you
are motivated by this reasoning and hence choose one box and find one million
dollars inside. Nonetheless, it seems absolutely wrong to say in such a situation
that (i-b) is true — had you taken both boxes, you would have been even richer!
Thus, in the standard Newcomb scenario, the fact that makes (i-a) true does
not make (i-b) true.
But suppose we change the puzzle to make the contents of the box
causally downstream of your choice, so that choosing one box generally yields
a million in box B and choosing both boxes generally results in there being
nothing in box B. In such a situation (i-a) still seems true. But unlike in the
standard Newcomb scenario, the same fact that is sufficient for the truth of
(i-a) (your choice determining the contents of box B) is also sufficient for the
truth of (i-b).
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interpretations. In Meeting-1, (17) has an epistemic interpretation — it
is true iff all the worlds compatible with your knowledge in which
Sue doesn’t meet the boss are worlds in which Ben does. In Meeting-2,
(17) has a metaphysical interpretation — it is true iff all metaphysically
possible futures from some past branch point in which Sue doesn’t
meet the boss are ones in which Ben does. Given that (18) is inter-
preted metaphysically, we predict that it is equivalent to (17) uttered
in Meeting-2, but not (17) uttered in Meeting-1.45
This should be sufficient for us to conclude that my theory does not
over-generate interpretations — it seems to predict exactly the behavior
of future indicatives that we find. However, one may wonder whether
the data here count as a point in favor of my simple past theory over
some modal past-style theories. For instance Iatridou (2000)’s theory
predicts that subjunctive conditionals have (or can get) metaphysical
interpretations, but it predicts that future indicatives are only inter-
preted epistemically (since there is no extra layer of past tense to do
the “modal distancing”). Nonetheless, one might think that such the-
ories can still predict the variation in the “stand or fall” behavior of
(17) in Meeting-1 and Meeting-2, perhaps simply because even the
epistemic interpretation of (17) is false in Meeting-2.
My objection to this strategy is that, if Ben is not scheduled for a
backup meeting, then (17) is false as uttered in Meeting-2, even if you
in fact know that either Ben or Sue will meet the boss on Monday (which is
sufficient for the truth of (17) on its epistemic interpretation). To bring
out this intuition clearly, consider the following third situation:
45. It is very plausible that (18) is interpreted metaphysically. Remember that
subjunctives seem to receive epistemic interpretations only in contexts in which
we are explaining or evaluating some past behavior (§2.1), and neither Meeting-
1 nor Meeting-2 is such a context.
Meeting-3. On Sunday you hear from a reliable friend that either
Sue or Ben will meet with the boss on Monday. You think it
much more likely that Sue will be the one meeting the boss,
and that Ben is lined up for a backup meeting with the boss
in case Sue’s meeting doesn’t take place. You thus say, “Ben is
scheduled as a backup meeting in case Sue doesn’t show, so if
Sue doesn’t meet with the boss on Monday, Ben will.”
Suppose that in the world of Meeting-3, Sue meets the boss on Mon-
day and there is no backup meeting scheduled with Ben. In that case,
I submit that (17) is false as uttered in Meeting-3. This is so, despite
the fact that you know (from your friend’s testimony) that either Sue
or Ben will meet the boss. Thus, (17) is false as uttered in Meeting-
3 even though all of the worlds compatible with what you know in
which Sue doesn’t meet the boss are ones in which Ben does. But the
latter condition is sufficient for the truth of (17) on its epistemic inter-
pretation. Hence, there must be a distinct interpretation of (17) that it
has in contexts like Meeting-2 and Meeting-3. I conclude that the data
here provide a point in favor of my theory over certain modal past
theories.
3. Responses to Objections
3.1 Inescapable clashes
The first challenge to my theory targets the prediction that future in-
dicatives have metaphysical interpretations. The challenge is to explain
why future indicatives are invariably infelicitous when preceded by the
negation of their antecedents, as in (19):46
(19) #Sue will meet the boss tomorrow, but if Sue doesn’t meet him
tomorrow, Ben will.
46. Of course, a speaker might utter pp, but if not-p, qq because she is aware
that her audience likely won’t accept her assertion of p, and she wants to in-
dicate a backup position, q, in that event. Such utterances of (19) are felicitous.
However, an ordinary assertive utterance of pp, but if not-p, qq, where the
asserter intends both conjuncts to be accepted, is infelicitous.
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This is a challenge to the claim that future indicatives have metaphysi-
cal interpretations because it is not clear why sentences like (19) ought
to be infelicitous if future indicatives have metaphysical interpreta-
tions.
Let us flesh out this challenge a bit more carefully. Notice that an
indicative whose consequent is about the past, like (1), which only
receives an epistemic interpretation, is generally infelicitous when pre-
ceded by an assertion of the negation of its antecedent:
(20) #Sue met the boss yesterday, but if Sue didn’t meet the boss
yesterday, Ben did.
A natural explanation of the infelicity of (20) appeals to the following
claims:
(a) An epistemic conditional is appropriately uttered only if it is com-
mon ground that its antecedent is epistemically possible,47 and
(b) For any p, if p is common ground at t, then it is not common ground
that ¬p is epistemically possible at t.48
Some independent evidence for (b) is that it correctly predicts that
accepting an assertion of some epistemic possibility claim results in
the negation of its prejacent not being common ground (cf. Stalnaker
47. This follows from the more general claim that conditionals presuppose that
their domains are non-empty, together with the assumption that uttering a
sentence p with presupposition pi is appropriate only if pi is common ground
(at the time immediately after the utterance but before the assertion is accepted
or rejected; cf. Stalnaker [2002], von Fintel [2008]).
48. “Expectational” uses of ‘should’ raise a challenge for (b):
(i) Steve is not here, but he should be. Expectational
Unlike “Steve is not here, but he might/must be,” (i) is felicitous. However, I
think this is reason enough to hold that expectational ‘should’ is not epistemic
(cf. Yalcin [2015]). Instead, we may model the behavior of expectational ‘should’
by assigning it an empty informational modal base and an ordering source that
models the information provided by some schedule.
[1970], Swanson [2011], Yablo [2011], Yalcin [2007, 2011], Willer [2013],
Khoo [2015]). Suppose pmight pq is assertively uttered and accepted.
Then, it will be common ground that p is epistemically possible. Then
from (b) it follows that ¬p is not common ground. Another piece of
evidence for (b) is that it predicts the infelicity of Moore-paradoxical
strings like pp, but it might be that not-pq (where ‘might’ has an epis-
temic interpretation; cf. DeRose [1991], Gillies [2000], Stanley [2005],
Yalcin [2007], Dorr & Hawthorne [2013], Worsnip [2015]). Someone as-
sertively uttering pp, but it might be that not-pq asserts p and might
¬p. From (b), it follows that an assertion of p is a proposal that p be
common ground in the conversation, and also that it not be common
ground that ¬p is epistemically possible. But asserting might ¬p just
is to propose that it be common ground that ¬p is epistemically pos-
sible. So, we expect such utterances to be self-frustrating and hence
infelicitous.
The explanation of why sentences like (20) are infelicitous then
goes like this. Assertions are proposals to make their contents com-
mon ground in the conversation. If my assertion of p is accepted, it
will be common ground that p, and then by (b) it will not be common
ground that ¬p is epistemically possible. Hence, by (a) uttering the
conditional pif not-p, qq will be inappropriate. Hence, uttering pp, and
if not-p, qq is self-frustrating: if my assertion of p is accepted, uttering
pif not-p, qq will be inappropriate.49 The challenge is that, if future
indicatives have metaphysical interpretations, we expect the future in-
dicative in (19) to have a metaphysical interpretation; in that case, the
above explanation will not apply and the sentence should have a felic-
itous reading.
It is important that to be clear about the dialectical situation here.
49. This line of reasoning assumes that this presupposition of pif not-p, qq is
not accommodated when uttered just after assertively uttering p. But this is a
very plausible assumption. That the sentence #I don’t have a sister, and I have to
pick up my sister at the airport is invariably odd is evidence that we don’t gener-
ally accommodate in cases where the assertor commits herself to the negation
of something she immediately goes on to presuppose.
philosophers’ imprint - 20 - vol. 15, no. 32 (december, 2015)
justin khoo On indicative and subjunctive conditionals
I have already argued that future indicatives have both metaphysical
and epistemic interpretations (§2.2). The challenge being raised now
does not target my argument for that claim, but rather an apparent
consequence of it — namely, that it (incorrectly) predicts that strings
like (19) ought to be felicitous on one interpretation. Thus, my goal
here will be show that this is not an inevitable consequence of my the-
ory. Rather, my theory can reasonably predict the inevitable oddness
of (19).
My defensive strategy here is to endorse two principles analogous
to (a) and (b):
(a’) A metaphysical conditional is appropriately uttered only if it is
common ground that its antecedent is metaphysically possible,
and
(b’) For any p, if p is common ground at t, then it is not common
ground that ¬p is metaphysically possible at t.
With both (a)/(a’) and (b)/(b’), we can give an explanation for why
(19) is odd (regardless of whether it is interpreted epistemically or
metaphysically) that is exactly analogous to our explanation why
(20) is odd. But why accept (a) and (b)? Like (a), (a’) follows from
the general principle that conditionals presuppose that their domains
are non-empty and that utterances of sentences with presupposition
failures are infelicitous. However, (b’) is less obvious and requires
some argument and defense. I will first defend (b’) against three
challenges, and then provide three positive arguments in favor of it.
Challenge 1. If (b’) were true, then we expect pp, but it might have
been that not-pq (where ‘might have’ is interpreted metaphysically)
to be infelicitous, for the same reason that (b) predicts that pp, but it
might be that not-pq is infelicitous (as discussed above). However, we
find a clear contrast between such sentences:
(21) #Sue is in a meeting, but she might not be in a meeting.
(22) Sue met the boss yesterday, but she might not have met him
then.
So (b’) is false.
Response. The second conjunct of (22) is past-tensed: it asserts that it
was at some (relevant) time in the past metaphysically possible for Sue
to have skipped the meeting, not that it is now metaphysically possible
for Sue to have skipped the meeting. Thus, (b’) doesn’t incorrectly
predict that pp, but it could have been that not-pq will be infelicitous;
though it is not common ground that ¬p is metaphysically possible at
t, it may still be common ground that ¬p is metaphysically possible at
some earlier time t′.
Challenge 2. Sentences like the following are felicitous:
(23) You didn’t do your homework, but you should have!
Suppose ‘should have’ here quantifies over the deontically best
metaphysically possible worlds at the time just after the assertion
of the first conjunct of (23) is accepted (call this time t). By (b’), the
acceptance of that assertion should lead to it being presupposed
that there are no metaphysically possible worlds at t in which the
addressee did her homework. It then follows that the second conjunct
of (23) should be false, and hence that (23) should be incorrectly
predicted to be infelicitous since it would be self-defeating to assert.
Response. ‘Should’ in the second conjunct is evaluated at a past
time — it quantifies over the deontically best metaphysically possible
worlds at some earlier time. Here is a quick argument for this claim. If
‘should have’ in “You should have done your homework” is evaluated
at the present time, then it would mean that it is now the case that
you should bring about some past event of your having done your
homework. But it is clearly not true that you now should bring
about some past event of having done your homework, since this is
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something you cannot now do. Nonetheless, the second conjunct of
(23) is not clearly not true. Therefore, ‘should have’ is not evaluated at
the present time. Rather, it seems to mean that it was (at some relevant
past time) the case that you should (then) do your homework. Thus, it
is past-tensed.
Challenge 3. The trick of appealing to past-tensed modals will not
work with “pie in the sky” uses of deontic ‘should,’ as in (24):
(24) There ought to be world peace, but there never will be.
So, what explains why such sentences are felicitous?
Response. It seems plausible that “pie in the sky” uses of deontic
modals quantify over the deontically best worlds, not the deontically
best metaphysically possible worlds. Thus, I propose that such uses
of deontic modals are assigned an empty informational modal base
and an ordering source that models the relevant deontic principles.
The resulting domain of ‘should’ will be the deontically best possible
worlds, including those which are now metaphysically and epistemi-
cally impossible. This correctly predicts the felicity of sentences like
(24).
I turn now to offer three positive arguments in favor of (b’). The first is
that it predicts that sentences like the following are infelicitous:
(25) #Sue will meet the boss tomorrow, though she might not.
If the first conjunct of (25) is accepted, then by (b)/(b’), it will not be
common ground that it is epistemically or metaphysically possible that
Sue will not meet the boss tomorrow. But asserting that Sue might not
meet the boss tomorrow just is to propose that it be common ground
that it is possible (epistemically or metaphysically) that Sue will not
meet the boss tomorrow. Hence, we expect sentences like (25) to be
infelicitous for the same reason the Moore-paradoxical pp, but it might
be that not-pq to be infelicitous (because assertively uttering them is
self-frustrating).50
The second argument for (b’) is that it follows from (b) given the
following reasonable assumption about the relationship between meta-
physical and epistemic possibility:
M-E Link: If p metaphysically possible at t, then p is epistemically
possible at t.
If M-E Link is a conceptual truth, then (b’) follows from (b).51 There-
fore, since (b) is plausible, (b’) ought to be plausible as well. But is
it plausible that M-E Link is a conceptual truth? I think this is a rea-
sonable hypothesis. If M-E Link is a conceptual truth, we (correctly)
predict that strings like the following will be invariably odd when ‘has
to’ is interpreted epistemically:
(26) #It has to be the case that John will lose the election, though
right now he is still able to win.
Interpreted epistemically, the first conjunct of (26) entails that it is epis-
temically necessary that John loses the election. The second conjunct
entails that it is metaphysically possible that John wins the election.
Thus, from M-E Link it follows that it is epistemically possible that
50. An alternative explanation of the oddity of (25) is that future-might claims
are invariably epistemic — see DeRose (1998). I lack the space to discuss
DeRose’s alternative here, but I mention it to note that my aim in this sec-
tion is primarily defensive, and hence not to provide arguments for (b’) which
would persuade my opponents, but merely to articulate plausible reasons in
its favor.
51. Let ‘3tM/E p’ denote the proposition that p is metaphysically/epistemically
possible at t, and ‘CGt(p)’ denote the proposition that p is common ground at
t. Quick proof: assume for reductio that (i) CGt(p) and (ii) CGt(3tM¬p). From
(i) and (b) it follows that ¬CGt(3tE¬p). From (ii) and the conceptual truth M-E
Link (3tM p ⊃ 3tE p) it follows that CGt(3tE¬p). But this is a contradiction, so
we reject our reductio assumption. Hence, ¬(CGt(p)∧CGt(3tM¬p)). And thus
(b’) follows, given that the conditional in (b’) just is the material conditional.
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John wins the election. But this is inconsistent with the first conjunct
of (26), interpreted epistemically.
The third argument is that adopting (a)/(b) and (a’)/(b’) provides
the ingredients for a plausible account of the counterfactuality implica-
ture of subjunctive conditionals (cf. Anderson [1951], Stalnaker [1975],
Karttunen & Peters [1979], Iatridou [2000], Ippolito [2003, 2006, 2013],
von Fintel [1997], Leahy [2011]). The basic sketch of the account is this.
Given (a)/(a’) and (b)/(b’), for a present-evaluated (indicative) condi-
tional to be uttered appropriately, its antecedent must be compatible
with the context set (i.e., it must not be common ground that its an-
tecedent is false). Therefore, any conditional whose domain is not com-
patible with the context set must be past-evaluated (subjunctive). But
then competent users of the language should recognize that a speaker
who utters a subjunctive conditional may be doing so (rather than ut-
tering its indicative counterpart) in order to access possibilities outside
of the context set, and a natural explanation for why the speaker would
do so is because the speaker thinks the antecedent/consequent of the
conditional are false. Hence, adopting (a)/(b) and (a’)/(b’) furnishes
us with the resources to predict the counterfactuality implicature con-
veyed by the use of many subjunctive conditionals as a manner impli-
cature.52 Although more needs to be said in favor of this account of
the counterfactuality implicature, for reasons of space I must set aside
such issues for another time.
Therefore, I think it is reasonable to accept both (a’) and (b’) (in
52. This is similar to Ippolito (2003)’s account. One crucial difference between
her theory and mine is that I am not committed to the domain of subjunctive
conditionals being the set of worlds compatible with what once was common
ground (see Ippolito [2003], p. 66) — a feature of her view that I find quite im-
plausible (what if we were not around back then, or not having a conversation
at that time?). Ippolito herself recognizes this problem for her view and sug-
gests a fix in footnote 14— that the domain is not the worlds compatible with
an actual past incarnation of the common ground, but what a speaker would
have presupposed at that time had she been alive and relevantly informed, etc.
I take it as a point in favor of my view that it’s not saddled with this implausi-
ble consequence.
addition to (a) and (b)). But then given (a’) and (b’), we have an expla-
nation of why (19) is odd that is exactly analogous to our explanation
why (20) is odd, even though we predict that future indicatives may
have both epistemic and metaphysical interpretations. I turn now to
consider some objections for my theory’s treatment of subjunctive con-
ditionals as involving historical modal bases.
3.2 Backwards subjunctives
So far, I have discussed the relationship between the time of the con-
ditional and the time of its consequent. However, what about the rela-
tionship between the time of the conditional’s antecedent and the time
of its consequent? All of the conditionals we have considered have
had consequents about times either overlapping or to the future of the
times of their antecedents. But some subjunctives are backwards, in that
the times of their consequents are before the times of their antecedents.
Here is one:
(27) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, he would have been talked
down by the CIA.
Lewis (1979) raises examples like these as a problem for a certain kind
of historical-modality theory of subjunctive conditionals that is super-
ficially similar to mine. On that theory, a subjunctive conditional is
true iff its consequent is true at all antecedent-worlds exactly like the
actual world up until just before the time at which its antecedent is hy-
pothesized to take place (and the possibly diverging thereafter). Lewis
correctly observes that such a theory would be forced to predict that a
backwards subjunctive like (27) is false simply because its consequent
is (since its consequent will be false at all of the relevant worlds in the
subjunctive’s domain).
However, my theory is emphatically not this one. diversity requires
that subjunctives with metaphysical readings have modal times which
precede the times their consequents are about. This means that the
modal time of (27) must be some time prior to Oswald being talked
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down by the CIA, and hence that (27) is true iff holding fixed the
past up until just before then, every g-best world in which Oswald
doesn’t shoot Kennedy are ones in which he is talked down by the CIA.
My theory is compatible with backtracking subjunctives for exactly the
same reason.53
What about the relationship between modal time and the time of
the conditional’s antecedent? I do not have time to go into the details
here, but I will follow Bennett (2003) in holding that modal time of a
subjunctive conditional should be some late past time that precedes
both the time of the antecedent (which will ensure the conditional
is not vacuous) and the time of the consequent (see especially pp.
209–220). In Khoo (2015a), I offer independent motivations for and
defend a more concrete version of this view.
3.3 Antecedents/Consequents About No Times in Particular
Lewis (1979) raises another problem for historical-modality ap-
proaches to subjunctives in general, which is that there appear to be
subjunctives with antecedents and consequents that are not about any
particular time.54 Consider:
53. See Khoo (2015a) for a proposal about how to predict several interesting
properties of backtracking subjunctives that makes use of the kind of simple
past theory motivated here.
54. One of Lewis’s examples, (i), doesn’t really illustrate the point he intends
to make:
(i) If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
Notice that the clauses “kangaroos have no tails” and “kangaroos topple over
(when trying to stand)” are generic (or habitual) claims about some (past, pos-
sibly extending into the future) interval of time. Indeed, different choices for
which the past interval the antecedent/consequent of (i) are about may lead to
truth-conditionally different interpretations of (i). If the interval is a relatively
recent one, then (i) is true iff all the (relevant) historically accessible worlds
from that recent time in which kangaroos (suddenly) have no tails are worlds
in which they topple over. This interpretation of (i) may be true — since kanga-
roos in fact use their tails to balance, if they were to lose them (some time in
the near past), they would topple over. But if the interval is much more distant,
perhaps prior to the evolution of kangaroos, then (i) seems false — if kangaroos
evolved not to have tails then presumably they would have evolved some other
(28) If time had been infinite, then time would have had no begin-
ning.
(28)’s antecedent and consequent do not seem to be about any partic-
ular intervals of time. Lewis rightly took examples like this to raise
trouble for a theory of subjunctives on which we hold fixed the past
up until the time at which the antecedent is hypothesized to take place.
(28) is trouble for such a theory because its antecedent is not about any
particular interval of time, so there is no straightforward way to “hold
history fixed up until the time at which (28)’s antecedent takes place,”
and so the semantics cannot evaluate (28).
It is tempting to think that a similar problem arises for my theory.
After all, given diversity, for (28) to have a metaphysical interpreta-
tion, it must be the case that there is a time at which it is historically
contingent whether (28)’s consequent holds. But this seems impossible
given that (28)’s consequent is not about any particular time. However,
this is in fact not a problem for my theory. Recall the definition of
historical modal bases:
necessity of the past:
For any world w, time t, and proposition p about an interval that
doesn’t extend beyond t: p ∈ fH(w, t) iff p is true at w.
Let ‘infinite’ denote the proposition expressed by the consequent of (28),
and suppose that infinite is not about any particular interval of time. It
follows immediately that it is not about any interval that does not ex-
tend beyond t. Therefore, infinite 6∈ fH(w, t) and ¬infinite 6∈ fH(w, t)
for any w, t. Therefore, (28) meets the diversity requirement for his-
mechanism for not toppling over. My theory predicts these two interpretations
by the fact that they involve different modal times — the former involves a time
just before the kangaroos lose their tails and the latter before kangaroos evolve.
We see, then, that the interpretation of the antecedent and consequent (and in
particular what time they are about) constrains the interpretation of the condi-
tional, just as we would expect given the semantics sketched in §1.
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torical modal base at all times, and hence can receive a metaphysical
interpretation.55
But now notice that my view faces a slightly different problem re-
garding (28), for it follows that the indicative version of (28) ought to
also have a metaphysical interpretation! Is this prediction correct?
(29) If time is infinite, then time has no beginning.
I think it is. It seems possible to interpret (29) metaphysically — that is,
as saying something about the nature of the world, rather than what we
know about it.56 A possible context that might favor a metaphysical in-
terpretation of (29) is one in which two metaphysicians are discussing
characteristics of temporal unboundedness. Certainly, in such a con-
text, the metaphysicians don’t intend to make claims about what they
know about temporal unboundedness, but rather directly about time
and infinity itself. 57 Therefore, subjunctives with antecedents and con-
55. You may alternatively think that infinite is about an interval that overlaps
every time. Then infinite is about an interval that extends partly beyond t, so
in that case necessity of the past will still entail that infinite 6∈ fH(w, t) and
¬infinite 6∈ fH(w, t), for any w and t.
56. Consider also “ESPN” conditionals (cf. von Fintel [2005]), which have a
metaphysical interpretation despite being clearly indicative:
(i) If Ramirez doesn’t catch that, it’s a double and the tying run is in scoring
position.
A possible way of handling such conditionals within my semantics is that they
are an instance of “historical present tense” in which context fixes the time
of the conditional to be some relevant past time, and then the consequent is
interpreted as about a time to the future of that time.
57. However, the metaphysical interpretation of (29) is clearly not the default
one, whereas the opposite is the case for its subjunctive counterpart:
(i) If time were infinite, then time would have no beginning.
An explanation of this might go as follows. Since we’ve come to con-
ventionally express metaphysical modal claims by way of past-tensed
modals/conditionals, we expect that the default interpretation of non past-
tensed modals/conditionals would be epistemic. This would also explain why
the metaphysical interpretation on (29) is hard to get without sufficient back-
ground context.
sequents about no times in particular pose no trouble for my theory.
Another challenge for my theory in this area arises from subjunc-
tives whose antecedents are entirely about the first moment of time:
(30) If the initial state of the universe had been different, everything
would have been different at all times.
Let ‘initial’ and ‘different’ denote the propositions expressed by (30)’s
antecedent/consequent, respectively. Suppose also that initial is about
w in that it states that the initial state of the universe is different
from w (and likewise for different). The problem (30) raises for my
theory is that, on its metaphysical interpretation, it is true iff ∀w′ ∈
D( f [initial]H , g, w, t
′) : w′ ∈ different, for the relevant past time t′. But
since initial is entirely about the first moment of time, then given ne-
cessity of the past, since ¬initial is true at w, ¬initial ∈ fH(w, t), for
all t. Therefore, for any time t : ∩ f [initial]H (w, t) = ∅, and thus for any
time t : D( f [initial]H , g, w, t) = ∅. Hence, my theory predicts there can
be no nontrivially true metaphysical interpretation of (30), yet it seems
nontrivial; it lacks the characteristic infelicity of a quantifier with an
empty domain, and furthermore it is not the case that both (30) and
(31) are true simply because initial is false:
(31) If the initial state of the universe had been different, everything
would have been the same at all times.
I admit that this is a sore spot for my theory. There are fixes nonethe-
less, although I am not sure which is the best to endorse. I list three
here:
• Deny that initial is entirely about the first moment of time.
If time is dense, then no proposition is about a single moment
of time, for there are none. Then for any proposition p about
interval i, there will always be a conditional time t such that i
extends partly to the future of t.
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• Redefine necessity of the past as follows:
necessity of the past:
Let t∗w be the first moment of time of w, if there is one. For any
world w, time t 6= t∗w, and proposition p about an interval that
doesn’t extend beyond t: p ∈ fH(w, t) iff p is true at w. Define
fH(w, t∗w) = ∅.
This strategy would allow us to model the natural intuition that
the metaphysical possibilities at the first moment of time are all
those worlds compatible with any setting of the initial condi-
tions compatible with the laws of nature.
• Accept that, strictly speaking, (30) is trivially true, but that ordinary
speakers tend not to hear it as such because they interpret it by
engaging in a bit of pretense, pretending that time is embedded in
a fictional super time. According to the fiction of super-time, there
is a conditional super time at which it is historically contingent
what the initial state of the universe is.
This strategy is motivated by the fact that we seem to engage
in this kind of pretense when evaluating claims for the sake of
argument or in reductio reasoning. For example:
(32) Suppose every prime is greater than 2. Then 2 would be
divisible by something other than 1 and itself. But it isn’t.
So it’s not the case that every prime is greater than 2.
I conclude that subjunctives with antecedents/consequents about no
particular times (such as (28)) raise no problems for my theory, and
although subjunctives with antecedents about the first moment of time
(such as (30)) do raise trouble, there are several reasonable responses
available on behalf of my theory.
3.4 The Problem of Hindsight
Consider the following situation (cf. Tichý [1976], Slote [1978], Barker
[1998], Bennett [2003], Edgington [2004], von Fintel [2012]):
Coin. Jones initiates an indeterministic coin toss. While the coin is
in the air, Sue bets on tails. The coin in fact lands heads.
In this situation, the following subjunctive conditional seems true:
(33) If Sue had bet on heads, she would have won.
Indeed, Sue might regret betting on tails, thinking that (33) is true.
However, my theory faces a problem predicting that (33) is in fact true.
Here’s why. Suppose that (33)’s future indicative cousin, (34), is uttered
just before Sue makes her bet:
(34) If Sue bets on heads, she will win.
Intuitively, (34) is false as uttered in such a context, or at least not
true (even on its metaphysical interpretation). This seems so because
at no time prior to the coin actually landing heads was it determined
to land heads (given that it was tossed in an indeterministic way). The
simplest way to incorporate this observation into my semantics is to
suppose that the ordering source g for metaphysical interpretations of
subjunctive conditionals is lawful— that it takes a world w and time t
into the set of propositions that state the laws of w after t.58 Then, since
at no time t prior to the time at which Sue wins/loses (this constraint
58. If we understand a law as an exceptionless regularity, these would be the
propositions stating regularities that are true at w and are exceptionless after
t. However, other theories of laws will be compatible with there being proposi-
tions that state a law of w after t. For instance, if worlds are four dimensional
manifolds, and if there can be propositions describing things just like laws
except that they are true of only part of a world (a partial law), then a proposi-
tion describing a law of w after t will be just that proposition which describes
a partial law that’s true of at least the temporal part of w after t. This bears
similarity to Goodman’s suggestion that a law-like statement is one that is a
law except that it might not be true (cf. Yablo [2014] for discussion and a theory
of aboutness that may be useful in characterizing partial laws). The proposal
here is similar to Lange (2000)’s discussion of violations of laws that are “off
stage” and still allow the law to be reliable even though false at that world (pp.
73–77).
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is ensured by diversity) will it be the case that ∀w′ ∈ D( f [bet], g, w, t) :
w′ ∈ win, in which case we predict that (34) will be false as uttered
prior to Sue making her bet (let ‘bet’ denote the proposition that Sue
bets on heads and ‘win’ the proposition that Sue wins). But now notice
that this fact makes my theory unable to predict a true, nontrivial,
metaphysical interpretation of (33).59,60 Following Edgington (2004),
let’s call this the problem of hindsight.
Before considering my response to this problem, I should note at
the outset that it is a deep problem with an extensive literature (in ad-
dition to the work cited above, see Schaffer [2004], Noordhof [2005],
Kaufmann [2005a], Phillips [2007, 2011], Walters [2009], Won [2009],
Ahmed [2010, 2011], Arregui [2009], Ippolito [2013a,b]). Hence, I can-
not hope to address all the complexities of the problem here. There
are at least two responses to this problem that are available to my
theory. The first response is to reject the intuition that (33) is true in
Coin.61 Since this response requires no additional modifications to my
view, and is not entirely unreasonable (see the discussion in footnote
61), I won’t elaborate upon it here. The other response is to reject the
59. I say ‘nontrivial’ here because if w is a world in which Sue in fact didn’t
bet on heads (as is the case in Coin) and t a time after which it is historically
settled that Sue didn’t bet on heads, then ∀w′ ∈ D( f [bet], g, w, t) : w′ ∈ win will
hold trivially, since D( f [bet], g, w, t) = ∅. However, although we could save the
theory by way of pointing out that it can predict a true interpretation of (33) on
which it is true (though trivially so), I find such a response unsatisfying. After
all, (33) doesn’t suffer from the kinds of problems (for instance, presupposition
failure) that usually face universally quantified claims that are trivially true
(e.g., #Every living US Civil War veteran attended last night’s gala).
60. (33) is arguably false on its epistemic interpretation as well, since at no
earlier time (at which one had a nonzero credence in that Sue bet on heads)
was one conditionally certain that Sue would win given that she bet on heads.
61. Phillips (2007, 2011) endorses this proposal, arguing that the intuition that
(33) is true, or acceptable, in a situation like Coin arises from the “vestiges of a
deterministic mindset” and is in fact incorrect. Thus, according to Phillips both
(33) and (34) are false, or unacceptable (as uttered in their respective contexts),
given Coin. I won’t rehearse Phillips’ argument here, though suffice to say the
intuitions in this area are rather complex. See the discussion below for a sense
of some of the complications.
intuition that the future indicative (34) is false in this scenario. This re-
sponse is endorsed by Edgington (2004), although in a framework very
different from the one I’m now working within. In what follows, I will
show how such a response is available to my theory, and is further-
more quite plausible. Thus, there are at least two reasonable solutions
to the problem of hindsight available to my theory (though I won’t
officially endorse a particular solution at this time).
Basically, the strategy of the second response is to predict that (33)
and (34) are both true (as uttered in their respective contexts, on their
metaphysical interpretations) in the scenario Coin. On my theory, this
amounts to endorsing a commitment to (33) being assigned an order-
ing source g in the relevant context of Coin such that, for the relevant
past time t: ∀w′ ∈ D( f [bet], g, w, t) : w′ ∈ win, which, given the plausi-
ble assumption that the rules of the bet continue to hold at worlds in
the domain of (33), requires that ∀w′ ∈ D( f [bet], g, w, t) : w′ ∈ heads.
Therefore, this strategy will involve adding additional true proposi-
tions to the ordering source beyond those propositions which state
laws — we need additional matters of fact as well, among them that
the coin lands heads. One way to do this is to define a notion of a
hindsightful ordering source:
Def 4 (Hindsightfulness). g is a hindsightful ordering source iff for all
w, t: g(w, t) contains all and only propositions about times extending
beyond t that are true at w.
And then suppose that metaphysical interpretations are constrained by
Hindsight:
Hindsight: the metaphysical interpretation of any modal (condi-
tional) will have a hindsightful ordering source g.
However, this won’t do as it stands, for it entails that (35) is also true
(in Coin), yet intuitively (35) is false!
(35) If Smith (rather than Jones) had flipped the coin, Sue would
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have lost.
The reason is that Sue in fact bet tails and the coin in fact landed
heads, so both of these propositions will be among g(w, t) given
Hindsight, and hence ∀w′ ∈ D( f [Smith], g, w, t) : w′ ∈ lose. But since
(35) is intuitively false (in Coin), it seems what we need is a way
to predict that (34) is true that doesn’t thereby predict that (35) is
also true. The natural fix is to constrain the “hindsight facts” that
are added to g(w, t) to those which are causally independent of the
antecedent of the relevant conditional. Where f (w, t) is the set of
historical propositions at w, t, let f+(w, t) be the union of f (w, t) with
the set of propositions stating laws of w after t. Then, we define an
f-hindsightful ordering source as follows:
Def 5 (F-Hindsightfulness). g is an f -hindsightful ordering source iff
for any w, t : g(w, t) contains all and only propositions p about matters
of particular fact such that:
i. p is true at w,
ii. p is about some time extending beyond t,
iii. p is compatible with ∩ f+(w, t), and
iv. For any p-world w′ ∈ ∩ f+(w, t): p is true at w′ for the same reason
p is true at w.62
The f-hindsightful propositions in g(w, t) will be those true propositions
of w about times extending beyond t which are true at worlds in the
lawfully-constrained modal base for the same reason they are true at
w. Then, we endorse Hindsight*:
Hindsight*: the metaphysical interpretation of any modal (condi-
tional) which has f as its modal base will have an f-hindsightful
ordering source g.
62. The notion here of true for the same reason is intended to be a placeholder
for something more precise, perhaps sharing the same cause, sharing the same
explanation, or sharing the same ground (cf. Kment [2006a]).
Since heads is true at worlds in ∩ f [bet]+ (w, t) for the same reason it is
true at w (because Jones initiated the flip), by Hindsight*, it is in-
cluded in g(w, t). Hence, given Hindsight*, my theory predicts that
(33) is true in this context. But now notice that heads is not true at
worlds in ∩ f [Smith]+ (w, t) for the same reason it is true at w — this is
because at every heads-world w′ ∈ ∩ f [Smith]+ (w, t), Smith initiated the
flip at w′ and is thus the cause of heads being true at w′. But at w
Jones initiated the flip, and hence is the cause of heads being true at w.
Thus, given Hindsight*, heads is not included in g(w, t). Hence, given
Hindsight*, my theory will predict that (35) is false. I won’t defend
this implementation of the strategy at this time, since my response to
the problem here is independent of precisely how we secure this result
on our semantics.63 Notice for now that, in adopting this commitment,
my theory thereby predicts that both (33) and (34) are true (as uttered
in their respective contexts) in Coin.64
63. For instance, see Kratzer (1989, 2012), Veltman (2005), Arregui (2009), Ip-
polito (2013b,a), Kaufmann (2013) for more discussion and some alternative
ways to predict these contrasts. I want to note that I am not committed here
to Hindsight* over these alternative proposals. In other work, I explore
how Hindsight* compares with Kratzer’s “lumping” theory and Veltman’s
appeal to dependent and independent propositions. Of particular interest
here are “Goodman pairs” (Goodman [1947], Lewis [1973]):
(i) a. If New York City were in Georgia, New York City would be in the
South.
b. If Georgia included New York City, Georgia would not be entirely
in the South.
64. Ippolito (2013b,a) raises a challenge for views like the one sketched above
about hindsight subjunctives, which goes as follows:
Peter and Susan are taking turns flipping coins and betting. Part of the
rules of their game is that whoever flips pays $10 if they lose the bet
that round, while the non-flipper pays $0 if they lose that bet. Just now,
it’s Peter’s turn, and he bets on heads, while Susan bets on tails. Peter
flips the coin and it lands heads. Susan pays Peter nothing.
(i) If it had been Susan’s turn, she would have lost $10.
Ippolito proposes that (i) is true in this scenario. However, my theory given
Hindsight* predicts the wrong result. This is because on my theory, in eval-
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Now, admittedly, this prediction may seem implausible in light of
our intuition that (34) is false (or not true). But consider the following
situation (cf. Edgington [2004]): Ben, a friend of Sue’s, has a powerful
hunch that the coin will land heads; thus, he says (34). Of course, prior
to the flip, knowing what we do about Coin, we would be inclined to
reject his assertion, or think that what he said is false (or at least not
true). However, after Sue in fact bets on tails and the coin in fact lands
heads, it seems reasonable for you to say to Ben, “Oh, you were right
after all! If Sue had bet on heads, she would have won!”. This is just
another instance of the future indicative (34) standing or falling with
its past subjunctive cousin (33), and hence is evidence that they are
intuitively equivalent. Thus, there is some reason to think that (34) is
in fact true, contra our intuition that (34) is false as uttered prior to the
flip. But then what explains the latter intuition?
uating (i) we hold fixed the history up until the last turn change and add to
it that it is Susan’s turn (so, basically Susan goes twice in a row), as well as
any facts after that which are true at any worlds compatible with that alterna-
tive history for the same reason as they are actually true. But since the coin’s
landing heads at those worlds will be due to Susan’s flipping the coin and
not Peter’s flipping the coin, heads will not be held fixed. Hence, there will be
worlds among D( f [Susan], g, w, t) at which Susan doesn’t lose any money, and
hence (i) will be false.
Ippolito proposes an alternative theory which does predict her intuition
about (i) as well the other kinds of cases discussed above. I will make two brief
remarks in response. First, if I were convinced that (i) is true, I would be happy
to adopt a version of her proposal — nothing in my theory depends crucially
on the approach to hindsight subjunctives sketched above being true (just as
long as the right solution is compatible with my semantics, which Ippolito’s is).
The second is that I’m not convinced that (i) is actually true. It seems equivalent
to:
(ii) If Susan had flipped the coin, she would have lost $10.
And this seems straightforwardly false — just as (35) does. So why would some-
one mistakenly think (i) to be true? One possibility is that the extra complexity
of the case makes it easy to forget that, given the rules, it is Susan’s turn iff
she flips the coin. Thus, when evaluating (i), perhaps we forget this and think
of turns going with payouts and being independent of flips. Granted, much
more can and should be said about this example and Ippolito’s theory, though
I must set aside these issues for the time being.
A plausible error theory about why we judge (34) to be false prior
to the flip is that there was simply no way to know that (34) was in fact
true prior to the coin landing heads. Supposing that the knowledge
norm of assertion is correct, then even if (34) is in fact true (and fur-
thermore true when uttered, prior to the flip), it won’t be assertable.65
This allows us to account for both the oddity of asserting (34) prior
to the flip, and also predict that the hindsight judgment (“you were
right!”) is true. Therefore, I take there to be something to be said in
favor of this second response to the problem of hindsight, which is
itself compatible with my theory of conditionals.66 Thus, I conclude
that there are reasonable responses to problem of hindsight on behalf
of my theory.
Before concluding, I pause to point out two more benefits of adopt-
ing Hindsight*. The first is that adopting Hindsight* allows my the-
ory to predict true backward counterfactuals with actually false con-
sequents. Consider (36) for instance in the following context: Jim and
Jack got along fine this morning and did not fight yesterday.
65. See DeRose (1996, 2002), Williamson (1996, 2000), Hawthorne (2004), Benton
(2011, 2012), Blaauw (2012). We could also do with a weaker assumption, for
instance that warranted assertability requires justified belief (cf. Lackey [2007])
or high rational credence (cf. Douven [2006, 2009]).
66. I should point out that, although this is Edgington’s response to the prob-
lem, it’s harder to motivate given her theory. This is because on her theory,
indicative and subjunctive conditionals do not express propositions but rather
conditional credences (which do not have truth values). Thus, Edgington can-
not appeal to the truth of (34) to explain why the hindsight evaluation is correct.
Rather, she is forced to adopt a sui generis rule of rational credences, holding
that, “The value to be assigned to the hindsight counterfactual trumps the most
rational value to be assigned to the forward looking indicative. The chance that
C given A, beforehand, provides the best available opinion on whether C if
A but it can be overturned by subsequent events, not predictable in advance.”
(Edgington [2004], p. 23). As far as I can tell, this is just a stipulation of her
theory, one that we would prefer some independent evidence for. No such
problem exists for my theory. For it, the truth of (33), along with its equiva-
lence with (34), explains the hindsight judgment (Edgington concedes this on
p. 22).
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(36) If Jim had been mean to Jack this morning, there would have
been a quarrel yesterday.
We assume, given diversity, that (36)’s modal time is early enough
to allow its consequent to be historically possible (say modal time
is t). Without Hindsight*, (36)’s domain will contain quarrel- and
¬quarrel-worlds and thus be false. Assuming Hindsight* provides a
fix. Notice first that (36) seems true only if the background laws are
incompatible with Jim and Jack not quarreling yesterday and Jim
being mean to Jack today — that is, if the background laws entail
¬quarrel ⊃ ¬mean. In that case, ¬quarrel ⊃ ¬mean should hold at
every world in ∩ f [mean]+ (w, t) (which, recall, is the set of mean-worlds
matching w up until t and then matching w’s laws after t). But given
this, ∩ f [mean]+ (w, t) entails quarrel. Hence, since by Hindsight* only
post-t propositions compatible with ∩ f [mean]+ (w, t) are among g(w, t),
we predict that (36) is true.
A second benefit of Hindsight* is that it helps my theory handle
subjunctives with true consequents. Suppose Sue was scheduled to fly
British Airways to London, but canceled at the last minute. It seems
true that:
(37) If Sue had been on that flight, it still would have been a British
Airways plane.
Since diversity demands that (37)’s modal base not settle whether the
plane belonged to British Airways, how does my theory predict the
truth of (37)? Here, I appeal to Hindsight*. Sue being on the flight
does not disrupt the truth of the post-t fact that it was a British Air-
ways plane. This is because that it is a British Airways plane is true at
worlds in ∩ f [ f light]+ (w, t) for the same reason it is true at w (because it
was bought by British Airways, e.g.). Therefore, by Hindsight*, the or-
dering source g(w, t) for (37) contains the proposition that it is a British
Airways plane. Therefore, we predict that (37) is true. In general, we
predict counterfactuals with true consequents are true whenever their
antecedents do not disrupt the truth of their consequents. This seems
to be the correct prediction.
4. Concluding remarks
We began with the following question:
the grammatical question: why do the grammatical differences
between indicatives and subjunctives (in particular the additional
past + future morphology on the latter) result, at least for paradigm
cases like (1) and (2), in indicatives being epistemic and subjunc-
tives being metaphysical?
In this paper, I articulated and defended a non-conventional answer to
this question.
Starting with the Simple Past hypothesis and adding two assump-
tions — one, that metaphysical interpretations (but not epistemic inter-
pretations) of conditionals arise from a domain of historically accessi-
ble worlds which share the same past (but not the same futures), and
two, the pragmatic constraint on interpretation diversity— I showed
how we can derive the difference in the meanings of (1) and (2) from
their grammatical differences. I defended my theory on the following
grounds:
(I) The key principles necessity of the past and diversity are reason-
able and independently plausible (§1.2).
(II) The resulting theory predicts similar results for both conditionals
and modals (§1.3–1.4).
(III) The additional predictions that the theory makes about subjunctive
conditionals (that they may have epistemic readings) and future
indicative conditionals (that they may have metaphysical readings)
are plausible (§2.1–2.2).
(IV) Finally, I argued that there are reasonable responses to four of the
most pressing objections to the theory (§3).
Of course, much more work remains. More needs to be said about the
pragmatics of modal time, backtracking interpretations, and the use of
Hindsight* to predict the hindsight data discussed in §3.4. In addition,
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my aim here is not to settle the debate between the simple past and
modal past hypotheses. Rather, the paper has been an extended mo-
tivation and defense of a particular non-conventional answer to the
grammatical question. I hope that seeing the costs and benefits of
the proposal gives us a better sense of what’s at stake in deciding be-
tween various answers to the question why indicative and subjunctive
conditionals differ in meaning, and ultimately, what indicative and
subjunctive conditionals mean. Finally, my discussion of the compo-
sitional semantics of indicative and subjunctive conditionals was left
mostly at an intuitive level (I flesh things out slightly more in the Ap-
pendix). There is a great deal of interesting work happening on the
compositional semantics of tense and aspect on conditionals (e.g., Ip-
polito [2003, 2004, 2006, 2013], Kaufmann [2005b], Arregui [2005, 2007,
2009], Schulz [2007, 2008, 2014], Iatridou [2014]), and I hope that fu-
ture developments of my theory can interface more robustly with that
work.67
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Appendix
Formal semantics
Here, I offer a more formal implementation of the semantic framework
sketched in §1.1. We state the semantics in two steps. The first involves
a translation of the English sentence to be analyzed into a sentence of
a formal language L that represents its logical form (at the relevant
level of abstraction). Then, we define an interpretation function JK which maps the corresponding sentence of L to its extension (a
truth value) relative to a context c and index i.68 I assume for now
that modal bases, ordering sources, worlds, and times are the only
parameters in our indices. Our preliminary semantics for modals may
be stated as follows:69
modalsJ2(p)Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff ∀w′ ∈ D( f , g, w, t): JpKc, f ,g,w′ ,t = 1J3(p)Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ D( f , g, w, t): JpKc, f ,g,w′ ,t = 1
I pause here to make a brief remark about the theory. Let the semantic
value of an expression of L be a function that takes a context c, modal
base f , ordering source g, world w, and time t into its extension. Given
our theory, J K assigns semantic values to expressions of L. However,
notice that this commitment about semantic values is compatible with
holding that the content of a declarative sentence in a context is a
proposition, understood as a set of possible worlds. Importing Def 3
from §1 yields:
Def 6 (Content). For any sentence p, the content of p in c is
{w : JpKc, fc ,gc ,w,tc = 1}.
68. Since our translation and interpretation procedures will be compositional,
L will translate subsentential expressions of English as well. I won’t go into
these details at this time.
69. Where ‘2(p)’ denotes the L translation of sentences involving necessity
modals such as pIt must be the case that pq and ‘3(p)’ denotes the L translation
of sentences involving possibility modals such as pit is possible that pq.
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I adopt a semantics for tenses and tense auxiliaries on which past,
press, and woll (the L translations of past and present tense mor-
phemes and the tense auxiliary “will” of English, respectively) denote
operators on the time parameter of evaluation:70
tenseJpast(p)Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ < t: JpKc, f ,g,w,t′ = 1Jpres(p)Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ≥ tc: JpKc, f ,g,w,t′ = 1Jwoll(p)Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ≥ t: JpKc, f ,g,w,t′ = 1
Two remarks on this semantics for tense.71 The first is that our time
variables here range over intervals, not moments, of time. The second
is that, compositionally, we are treating bare clauses like p as the
70. Most likely the domains of these operators will need to be restricted in
some way, to account for the fact that some tensed clauses seem to express
propositions about specific intervals, as in Partee (1973)’s famous example of
uttering I left the stove on while on my way to work. Alternatively, we could
analyze tenses as referring expressions as in Partee (1973), Enç (1987), Heim
(1994), Kratzer (1998). My choice to treat tenses as quantifiers rather than refer-
ring expressions is not crucial, and my theory of conditionals could be recast
within a referential tense semantics without changing my main point.
71. For a preliminary motivation for the semantics for pres and woll, consider
the following two data points. Unembedded, both can be used to express
claims about the present or the future:
(i) a. John is here now.
b. John will be here now.
(ii) a. John is here tomorrow.
b. John will be here tomorrow.
However, only woll can be felicitously embedded under a past directed tempo-
ral adverbial:
(iii) a. #Once, John makes a good mayoral candidate.
b. Once, John would have made a good mayoral candidate.
See Dowty (1979), Copley (2002), Ogihara (2007), Kaufmann (2005b) for fur-
ther discussion about the distinction between present futurates like (ii-a) and
futures like (ii-b).
logical form of an untensed sentence (or nonfinite clause). I extend
modals to cover conditionals by assuming (as above) that conditionals
are restricted necessity modals. Thus, the L translation of an indicative
conditional like (1) will be [2past(p)](past(q)).72 We then interpret
[2past(p)](past(q)) schematically as follows:
indicativeJ[2past(p)](past(q))Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff
. ∀w′ ∈ D( f [p], g, w, t): Jpast(q)Kc, f [p] ,g,w′ ,t = 1
(Where p = {w′: Jpast(p)Kc, f ,g,w′ ,t = 1}.)
Thus, an indicative conditional like (1) is true iff the proposition
expressed by its consequent past(q) is true throughout the best worlds
given f (restricted by p) and g. With subjunctive conditionals, I will
assume that the past tense on their antecedents and consequents is not
interpreted and merely there to mark agreement with the higher tense
governing the entire counterfactual (cf. Arregui [2005, 2007, 2009]).73
Hence, following Ogihara (1996, 2007), I’ll assume that the embedded
tenses on the antecedent and consequent of subjunctive conditionals
72. I adopt the notation of brackets ‘[ ]’ to indicate the merging of 2 and p into
a single constituent restricted modal at the level of logical form.
73. This move accounts for the “fake”-seeming quality of the past tense on
subjunctive conditionals (recall the data discussed in footnote 1). The move
is also a familiar one from the literature on sequence of tense, in which a
sentence like (i) can be understood to mean either (a) that in the past John
thought that Sue was (at that same time) in Cambridge, or (b) that in the
past John thought that Sue was (at some earlier time) in Cambridge.
(i) John thought that Sue was in Cambridge.
The (a)-reading is clearly the default here, and on it the past tense on the com-
plement of the main verb is not itself interpreted but instead gets its interpreta-
tion from the higher past tense on the main verb. Hence, the past tense merely
marks agreement with that higher tense. The (b)-reading is helped by adding a
temporal adverbial like “the day before” in the complement clause.
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are deleted at the level of logical form.74 Thus, the L translation of
a subjunctive like (2) will be past([2p](woll(q))). We then interpret
past([2p](woll(q))) as follows:75
subjunctiveJpast([2p](woll(q)))Kc, f ,g,w,t = 1 iff
. ∃t′ < t : ∀w′ ∈ D( f [p], g, w, t′) : ∃t′′ ≥ t′: JqKc, f [p] ,g,w′ ,t′′ = 1
Thus, on my schematic semantics, a subjunctive like (2) is true iff the
proposition expressed by its consequent woll(q) (relative to the past
time as shifted by the higher past tense) is true throughout the best
worlds given f (restricted by p) and g, as evaluated at some past time.
Times of Clauses
We now define a notion of the time of a bare clause in a context. Say
that the time of a bare clause p in c is the domain of its closest left-
dominating tense operator, if any. When p doesn’t fall in the scope
of any tense, say that the time of p in c is tc, the time of c. Thus, for
instance, the time of the bare clause p as it occurs in past(p) in c is (some
subset of, given that the domain of past will be restricted) {t : t < tc}.
The time of q as it occurs in past(woll(q)) in c is {t′ : t′ ≥ t, where t <
tc}. Say that modal/conditional time is the time that is the input to its
domain-determining function D for that particular modal/conditional.
74. This is another non-essential assumption. We might think the tenses are
really present at the level of logical form, and then follow Enç (1987) and as-
sume that the interpretations of embedded tenses are sometimes constrained
by higher tenses, or perhaps follow Kratzer (1998) and suppose a sequence of
tense rule of interpretation that nullifies the meaning of embedded tenses.
75. There is an important subtlety regarding the time at which the subjunc-
tive’s antecedent is evaluated. As stated, my semantics predicts that it is inter-
preted relative to the time of the context. However, this doesn’t account for the
“future-shifting” feature of conditional antecedents, in particular why we they
felicitously combine with future adverbials like “tomorrow.” Although I hope
to address this matter in future work, since this problem is extremely compli-
cated and ultimately orthogonal to my theory, I will set it aside for now. See
Kaufmann (2005b) for a possible fix.
Say that a conditional’s antecedent/consequent times are the times of
the bare (untensed) sentences that occur embedded in the conditional’s
if-clause and consequent clause respectively.
Proof that contextual equivalence ban entails diversity
contextual equivalence ban:
Simple modal sentences do not express propositions that are
contextually equivalent (true at all the same worlds in the context
set) to their prejacents.
diversity:
In any context c, the modal base fc for any modalM with prejacent
p and modal time t must be such that: ∃w ∈ C : p 6∈ fc(w, t) and
¬p 6∈ fc(w, t).
Proof. The proof proceeds by establishing that ¬diversity entails
¬contextual equivalence ban, from which it follows automatically
by contraposition that contextual equivalence ban entails diversity.
Suppose diversity is false. Then it is possible that there is some context
c and modal sentence M(p) with prejacent p and modal time t such
that ∀w ∈ C : p ∈ fc(w, t) or ¬p ∈ fc(w, t). Let ‘Mp’ denote the propo-
sition expressed byM(p) in c. We will prove that ∀w ∈ C : Mp↔ p is
true at w, and hence that contextual equivalence ban is false.
To do so, suppose w is an arbitrary world in C. We prove that Mp↔
p is true at w.
• Suppose Mp is true at w. Then it can’t be that ¬p ∈ fc(w, t).76 Since
∀w ∈ C : p ∈ fc(w, t) or ¬p ∈ fc(w, t), it follows that p ∈ fc(w, t).
76. It follows from this that there are no p-worlds in D( fc, g, w, t). Now, either
M is a possibility or a necessity modal. IfM is a possibility modal, then Mp is
false at w, contradicting our assumption. IfM is a necessity modal, then it may
be that Mp is true at w, but only if D( fc, g, w, t) is empty. We suppose that this
condition is ruled out by the fact that necessity modals presuppose that their
domains are non-empty, and are hence never trivially true. So Mp is false at w,
which contradicts our assumption. Therefore, it can’t be that ¬p ∈ fc(w, t).
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But since modal bases are factive, p is true at w.
• Suppose p is true at w. Then it can’t be that ¬p ∈ fc(w, t) since
modal bases are factive. Since ∀w ∈ C : p ∈ fc(w, t) or ¬p ∈ fc(w, t),
it follows that p ∈ fc(w, t). But then every world in D( fc, g, w, t) is
a p-world, for any g. Thus, Mp is true at w.
Since the choice of w ∈ C was arbitrary, it follows that ∀w ∈ C :
Mp ↔ p is true at w, and hence that contextual equivalence ban
is false. Thus, we conclude that contextual equivalence ban entails
diversity by contraposition.
Generalizing our predictions
I show that necessity of the past + diversity are sufficient to predict
the following:
(α) Non-future directed modals are invariably epistemic.
(β) Future directed modals may be metaphysical or epistemic.
Predicting (α). Let Φ be an arbitrary non-future directed modal
sentence, c be an arbitrary context, and w be an arbitrary world in C.
Let p be Φ’s prejacent in c. Thus, p is about a time which does not
extend to the future of t, Φ’s modal time. We have two options for the
modal base for Φ in c: it is either historical or informational. Suppose
fc is historical. Then either p is true at w or false at w. Since the time
of p does not extend beyond t, by necessity of the past, if p is true
at w then p ∈ fc(w, t), and if p is false at w then ¬p ∈ fc(w, t). Hence,
it follows that either p ∈ fc(w, t) or ¬p ∈ fc(w, t). But either way
diversity is violated. Hence fc cannot be historical. But this holds for
any context c and world in C, since the choice of context and world
was arbitrary. Suppose instead fc is informational. Then, as long as
p is not directly known (by the c-relevant party), the same reasoning
above will not show that diversity is violated. Hence, it is possible
that fc be informational. But since fc cannot be historical and can be
informational, if Φ is interpretable at all, we predict it must receive an
epistemic interpretation.
Predicting (β). Let Ψ be an arbitrary future oriented modal sentence, c
be an arbitrary context, and w be an arbitrary world in C. Let p be Ψ’s
prejacent in c. We have two options for the modal base of Ψ in c: it is
either historical or informational. Suppose fc is historical. Either p is
true at w or false at w. Since the time of p extends beyond t, it won’t
follow from this and necessity of the past that either p ∈ fc(w, t) or
¬p ∈ fc(w, t). Hence, no violation of diversity is ensured, as was the
case with the indicative conditional above. Therefore, as long as neither
p 6∈ fc(w, t) nor ¬p 6∈ fc(w, t), diversity will not be violated, and it is
possible that fc be historical. Of course, analogous reasoning to that in
the preceding paragraph shows that it is possible that fc be informa-
tional as well. Therefore, Ψ may receive a metaphysical interpretation
and that it may receive an epistemic interpretation.
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